

THE
SARVA-SIDDHANTA SANGRAHA
OF
SANKARĀCĀRYA

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION UNDER THE ORDERS OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS.

BY
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सत्यमेव जयते



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PREFACE.

THE full name of this work, as may be made out from the colophons given at the end of the chapters and also from the last stanza of the last chapter in it, is *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, which obviously indicates it to be an epitome of the accepted conclusions of all the philosophic systems current in India at the time of its production. Nevertheless, it appears to have been known by the comparatively shorter title of *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* also, as it is, for instance, found mentioned in the *Pramāṇattiraṭṭu* * of Manavālamāmuni, a well-known religious teacher of the Śrī-Vāiṣṇavas of South India. In the catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the India Office Library in London, we find the work described under this shorter title. Accordingly this shorter title has been adopted as the name of the work in this edition. Evidently the name of the well-known *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* of Sāyaṇa Mādhava is a somewhat different abbreviation of the title *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha*.

Five manuscripts have been used in preparing the text for this edition of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*.

* This Tamil name of the work means that it is a collection of authorities. It is in fact such a collection, the authorities referred to in a famous commentary on Saint Sathakōpa's Tamil psalms known as *Tiruvāymoḷi* being therein quoted and traced to their sources.

One of these, marked P, is a palm-leaf manuscript belonging to the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library here in Madras. Another, marked M, belongs to the Oriental Library in Mysore, and was very kindly placed at my disposal by Mr. A. Mahādēva Śāstrin, the Curator of that Library. The third, marked V, is a copy of another original, transcribed for the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library by Mr. S. P. V. Ranganāthācārya, the proprietor of the Ārṣa Press at Vizagapatam. The fourth, marked C, is a palm-leaf manuscript belonging to the Palace Library of H.H. the Mahārāja of Cochin; it was, through the kindness of the Mahārāja, permitted to be placed at my disposal for some months. The fifth, marked T, belongs to the Travancore Palace Library; and it became available to me through the kindness of Mr. V. P. Mādhava Row, C.I.E., who was at the time Dewan of Travancore. Of these, P and M form the foundation of the text printed in this volume. Both these are full of lacunæ; but it has been fortunate that the lacunæ in P could be mostly filled up with the aid of the material found intact in M. In spite of its incompleteness due to the fact of its being abruptly brought to an end with the eighth chapter, the manuscript V proved to be of special value, for the reason that it contains a commentary. Similarly C also is incomplete, containing only the last five chapters of the work. The manuscript T is a fragmentary one containing very little more than the chapters on the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya* systems.

Professor J. Eggeling, who appears to be responsible for the description of the manuscript of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, under No. 2442, in the catalogue of the Sanskrit

Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office in London, has therein stated that the work is “ (wrongly) ascribed to Śaṅkarācārya.” What his reasons for this opinion are, is not evident. In relation to a work of this kind it is clearly not appropriate to rely largely upon style for a proof of its authorship. In fact in regard to the question of authorship the evidence from style is always bound to be of an uncertain character, inasmuch as one man’s estimate of a given style need not be the same as that of another man, and inasmuch as it is also well known that one and the same author may write in different styles either at the same time or at different times. However, according to one of the readings, the twenty-first and the twenty-second stanzas in the first chapter may well seem to throw some doubt on Śaṅkarācārya’s authorship of this work. Those two stanzas would run thus in accordance with that reading :—

पूर्वाध्यायचतुष्केण मन्त्रवाच्यात्र देवता ।
 शङ्करेणोदिता तद्धि देवताकाण्डमुच्यते ॥
 भाष्यं चतुर्भिरध्यायैर्भगवत्पादनिर्मितम् ।
 चक्रे विवरणं तस्य तद्देदान्तं प्रचक्षते ॥

These *ślōkas* are not very clear and cannot be quite easily interpreted. But the occurrence therein of the name Śaṅkara and the reference to a *bhāṣya* by a *Bhagavat-pāda* are almost certain at the first instance to make the reader think that probably the great Śaṅkarācārya himself is mentioned by name here, and that he could not possibly have spoken of himself as *Bhagavatpāda*. This difficulty is got over, if we observe that there is another reading सङ्करेणोदिता in the place of शङ्करेणोदिता, and that,

in the commentary to be found in the manuscript V, this word *Śaṅkara* is interpreted to mean Śiva. Moreover this same commentary gives out that the *Bhagavatpāda* mentioned in this context is in fact Gōvinda, the well-known preceptor of the famous Śaṅkarācārya.

मगवत्पादः श्रीमान् शङ्कराचार्यगुरुर्गोविन्दमगवत्पूज्यः—this is how the expression is explained in the commentary. In dealing with the first half of the second stanza given above, this commentary gives as introduction—अस्य देवताकाण्डस्य भाष्यं सूत्राणां व्याख्यानं मगवत्पादनिर्मितमित्याह. Similarly in relation to the second half of the same stanza we find the introductory remark—उत्तरचतुष्कस्यापि भाष्यमाचार्यप्रणीतमित्याह. There is further the explanatory remark—तस्योत्तरचतुष्कस्य वेदान्तभूत्रस्य विवरणं शारीरकभाष्यं यच्चक्रे तल्लोकाः वेदान्तमिति प्रवदन्तीत्यर्थः. According to this commentator, therefore, Gōvinda, the *guru* of Śaṅkarācārya, must have written a commentary on the *Dēvatākāṇḍa* and another on the *Jñānakāṇḍa* of the one comprehensive *Mīmāṃsā-sāstra* of twenty *adhyaīyas*. There is nothing improbable in this, for tradition ascribes very great learning to this Bhagavatpāda Gōvinda. This same *guru* of Śaṅkarācārya is known to be the author, for instance, of a work on *Yōgu* known as *Yōgatārāvali*.* Accordingly, in the light of this commentary, the two stanzas quoted above from the *Śarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* cannot throw any real doubt on Śaṅkarācārya being its author. On the other hand they really tend to confirm his authorship in respect of that work.

* Vide No. 4357 in the Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras.

Moreover, it is highly improbable that this commentator could be ill-informed about the matter. The beginning of this commentary runs thus :—

श्रीगणेशाय नमः । श्रीशेषगुरुचरणाभ्यां नमः ॥
 केचिल्लक्ष्मीरमणमपरे पार्वतीप्राणनाथं
 ब्रह्मैवैके सकलजगदानन्दरूपं तथान्ते ।
 कर्तारं यं प्रकृतिपुरुषं क्लेशकर्मादिहीनं
 प्राहुर्लोकैस्त्वमिह जगतामादिभूतं नमामि ॥
 यत्प्रसादाधीनसिद्धिं पुरुषार्थचतुष्टयम् ।
 सरस्वत्यवतारं तं वन्दे श्रीमधुसूदनम् ॥
 आचार्यशङ्करकृतेः शेषगोविन्दमूर्तिना ।
 गूढार्थकपदव्याख्या सांप्रतं संप्रतन्यते ॥

At the conclusion of the commentary, which, as already pointed out, extends only up to the end of the system of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, we have the following colophon :—

इति श्रीशेषपण्डितसुत - शेषगोविन्द - विरचिते सर्वसिद्धान्तरह-
 स्यविवरणे भाट्टपक्षः समाप्तः ॥

गुरुणा मधुसूदनेन यद्यत्करुणापूरितचेतसोपदिष्टम् ।

तदिदं प्रकटीकृतं मयास्मिन् भगवच्छङ्करपूज्यपादमूले ॥

It comes out from these extracts that Śeṣa Gōvinda is the name of the author of the commentary, that he was the son of a certain Śeṣa and a disciple of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*, which is a famous polemical work on *Advaita-vēdānta*. That a pupil of such an ardent and highly learned follower of the teachings of Śaṅkarācārya as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī should have been well informed about Bhagavatpāda

Gōvinda's works, and also about the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* being a production of Śaṅkarācārya, appears to me to be very much more than merely probable.

It can be made out, I believe, that this commentator Śeṣa Gōvinda lived about 350 years ago. But it is evident that even before his time the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* was known to be the work of Śaṅkarācārya, for we find the already mentioned Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher, Maṇavālamāmuni, quoting passages from this work in his *Prāmāṇatirattu* with the remark सर्वसिद्धान्तसङ्ग्रहे शङ्करेणोक्तः ; and this Maṇavālamāmuni is considered to have lived in the concluding part of the fourteenth and the early part of the fifteenth century of the Christian era. Thus there is positive evidence to show that for over five hundred years at least the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* has been known to be the work of Śaṅkarācārya. Moreover, Mādhava, the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, appears to have been familiar with this work, although he does not mention it or its author by name in his *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*. In the portions dealing with the *Cārvāka-darśana* and the *Bauddha-darśana* in the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, there are a few stanzas quoted, which obviously belong to this *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*. There is for instance the stanza—

अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो वेदास्त्रिदण्डं भस्मगुण्डनम् ।

बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविकेति बृहस्पतिः ॥

This forms the penultimate *ślōka* in the second chapter of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*. In addition to quoting this opinion of Bṛhaspati, as given by another, the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* quotes also passages directly

from some work attributed to the same Brhaspati, wherein the above stanza occurs with its last quarter running as जीविका धानृनिर्मिता. In the *Buddhadarśana* portion of the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, we find the stanza—

परिव्राटकामुकशुनामेकस्यां प्रमदातनौ ।

कुणपः कामिनी भक्ष्य इति तिस्रो विकल्पनाः ॥

This is found as the seventh stanza in the *Yōgācāra* section of the fourth chapter of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*; and here it is, as may be easily seen, in its proper context. From this same *Yōgācāra* section the fourth stanza again is quoted in the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*. Besides these it contains the following stanza also, which is found in the *Mādhyanika* section of the fourth chapter of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*:

षट्केन युगपद्योगे परमाणोः षडंशता ।

षण्णां समानदेशत्वे पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ॥

Here again it may well be made out that this stanza can really be in its proper context in the latter work. Therefore it must be somewhat hard to deny that Mādhava, the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, was evidently familiar with the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, and that he looked upon its contents as being sufficiently trustworthy to be quoted as an authority.

Another point worthy of note in connection with the determination of the authorship of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* is that it contains no account of any system of thought which is positively known to be later in origin than the time of Śaṅkarācārya. On the other hand, it cannot be difficult to see how all the systems summarised

in the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* must have had their origin in days before Śaṅkarācārya. If, nevertheless, the work is held by any one to be a forgery, that opinion has, as it is usual in all such cases, to be based upon some sort of alleged cunning on the part of a Hindu forger, who, however, unlike all the other men of his tribe, has to be credited with the development of the historical sense so well in him that he could not betray his deceitful hand through chronological inconsistencies. There is also another item of internal evidence in the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, which lends further support to the view that Śaṅkarācārya must really have been its author. In the first half of the fifty-fourth stanza of the last chapter of this work, the author, wishing to say that the *manomaya-kōśa*, or what is often called the mind-sheath of the soul, is supported by the Supreme Soul, who is Existence-Knowledge-Bliss, mentions this Supreme Soul by the name of Gōvinda. Although Gōvinda is one of the well-known names of Viṣṇu, why the Supreme Soul should have been here designated by this particular name of Viṣṇu requires some explanation. The reason for this seems to be none other than that Gōvinda happens to have been the name of the *guru* of Śaṅkarācārya. It is generally believed by almost all religious students in India that the *guru* always deserves to be worshipped like God himself. In support of this there is the authority of this oft-repeated stanza :—

गुरुर्ब्रह्मा गुरुर्विष्णुर्गुरुर्देवो महेश्वरः ।

गुरुरेव परं ब्रह्म तस्मै श्रीगुरवे नमः ॥

The philosophy of the *advaitins* enables them to actually identify the *guru* with God : according to them the

guru is not only to be honoured and worshipped like God, but has actually to be looked upon as being none other than God Himself. We therefore find Śaṅkarācārya giving at the beginning of his *Vivēkacūḍāmaṇi* the following *maṅgala-stōka* :

सर्ववेदान्तसिद्धान्तगोचरं तमगोचरम् ।

गोविन्दं परमानन्दं महारुं प्रगतोऽस्म्यहम् ॥

The identification of the *guru* with God is distinctly obvious in this stanza ; and one may very well say that in Śaṅkarācārya's *Bhaja-gōvinda-stōtra* also such an identification is very probably intended. That both Mādhava and Sāyaṇa have maintained this same attitude of divine identity in relation to their *guru*, Vidyātīrtha, is well known to all readers of their numerous and varied works. In proof of this the following stanza to be found at the beginning of Sāyaṇa's commentary on the *R̥gveda*, for instance, may be quoted :

यस्य निश्चितं वेदा यो वेदेभ्योऽखिलं जगत् ।

निर्ममे तमहं वन्दे विद्यातीर्थमहेश्वरम् ॥

It is therefore clearly intelligible why the Supreme Soul is designated by the name of Gōvinda in the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* : and this internal proof in the work itself is certainly such as is very well calculated to show that Śaṅkarācārya must really have been its author. When the ascribed authorship of any old work is questioned, it is not always easy to give more satisfactory evidence to establish that authorship than what has been found to be possible in this case : and it is not without value as evidence that all the manuscripts of the work that have been utilised for this edition ascribe its

authorship to Śaṅkarācārya. The cumulative effect of all that has been stated here regarding the authorship of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* appears to me to make it unnecessary to doubt that its author is the celebrated Śaṅkarācārya himself.

Although there are here and there a few difficultly interpretable stanzas, the work is on the whole remarkable for its simplicity and freedom from the rancorous spirit of heated controversy. It is worthy of note that in the very first chapter of this work the oneness of the *Mīmāṃsā* as a *sāstra*—which extends over twenty *adhyāyas*—is distinctly recognised. Most students of the *Vedānta* literature in Sanskrit know that this idea of oneness, commonly called *sāstraikya*, has been a point of controversy between *Advaitins* and *Viśiṣṭādvaitins*, since the days of Rāmānujācārya, who, in commenting upon the first word in the very first aphorism in the *Vedānta-sūtras*, uses with effect the idea of such a *sāstraikya* to establish the accuracy of his own interpretation of that word. The importance attached by Rāmānujācārya and his followers to the idea of the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* being in fact one *sāstra* is definitely recognised by Mādhava in his *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*. Hence very probably the necessities of controversy led later on to the belief that the two *Mīmāṃsās* were really two distinct *sāstras*: and attention has already been drawn to the fact that Mādhava has not mentioned either the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* or its author by name in the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, although, as we have seen, he must have been familiar enough with the contents of the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*.

From the standpoint of Hindu *Vedāntic* controversy, there is also another noteworthy feature in the

Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha. In this work we are given a *Vyāsa-mata* as distinguished from the *Vēdānta-mata*. The former of these two *matas* is said to be based upon the religious and philosophic teachings contained in the *Mahābhārata*, while the latter is declared to rest upon Bhagavatpāda Gōvinda's explanation of the *Vēdānta-sūtras* held to have been composed by Vyāsa. It is to this explanation alone that Śāṅkarācārya would evidently give the name of *Vēdānta*. Whether Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa, the original author of the *Mahābhārata*, is also the real author of the *Vēdānta-sūtras* is a question that need not be raised here. Indian tradition says that Vyāsa is the author of both, and the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* has distinctly adopted this tradition. Kṛṣṇa, the son of Vasudēva and Dēvakī, evidently claimed to have been the 'Maker of the *Vēdānta*,' as it comes out from a statement in the *Bhagavadgītā*—वेदान्तकृद्वेदविदेव चाहम् (XV. 15). What this means also need not be discussed here. Similarly we may ignore the perplexing personality of Bādarāyaṇa as being either the same as, or another than, the traditionally accepted author of the *Vēdānta-sūtras*. If for the time being we agree with the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, we have to distinguish between a *Bhārata-mata* of Vyāsa and a *Sūtra-mata* of Vyāsa. Naturally then the question arises—whether one and the same Vyāsa did really teach two distinct *matas*. In this connection one is reminded of Dr. G. Thibaut's view that Śāṅkarācārya's interpretation of the *Vēdānta-sūtras* is different from what they were meant to teach by the *Sūtra-kāra* himself. Dr. Thibaut has declared that "the philosophy of Śāṅkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* than the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa." I know that there are many who will strongly object to the implication here that the

teachings of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa are different from the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. Whether Bādarāyaṇa faithfully interprets the *Upaniṣads* is indeed a very legitimate investigation to undertake. But it is clear enough that the aim of Bādarāyaṇa was evidently the harmonisation of the teachings of the *Mahābhārata* with the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*: and even so it cannot be held to be incontrovertible to say that he did not understand properly the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. That there is not even that amount of definiteness about the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*, as there is about the *Vedāntic* teachings given in the *Bhagavad-gītā* and in the *Mahābhārata*, is granted by many. It is therefore no wonder that Śāṅkarācārya's interpretation of the teachings of the *Upaniṣads* appears to certain competent scholars to be noticeably different from Bādarāyaṇa's interpretation of those same teachings. Śāṅkarācārya himself says about the end of his short introduction in the *Bhāṣya* यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारिरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः ; and this sentence is certainly capable of making it appear that the aim of Śāṅkarācārya was to try to evolve what he himself took to be the teachings of the *Upaniṣads* out of the *Vedānta-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa—that is, to put into the *Sūtras* what he himself understood to be the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*. Even orthodox *Advaitins* seem to accept this view in a general sort of way, and there is a stanza attributed to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī which gives a notably clever expression to it. The stanza is—

न स्तौमि तं व्यासमशेषमर्थ
सम्यङ् न सूत्रैरपि यो बबन्ध ।
विनापि तैः संग्रथितस्विलार्थ
तं शङ्करं नौमि सुरेश्वरार्यम् ॥

It is evident from this that it is granted by some *Advaitins* themselves that the *Vēdānta-sūtras* of Vyāsa are not responsible for the whole of the philosophy of Śāṅkarā-çārya: and one need not therefore be surprised when one sees them occasionally making a distinction between the *sūtra-kāra-mata* and the *bhāṣya-kāra-mata*. The distinction between a *Vyāsa-mata* and a *Vēdānta-mata*, as brought out in the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, is thus clearly confirmatory of the position of Dr. Thibaut in regard to what kind of *Vēdānta* it is that is really represented by the *Vēdānta-sūtras*. As he maintains, the whole question here is indeed one of interpretation. What the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* is, is itself dependent upon interpretation, which again is, in its turn, dependent upon the interpreter's religious and philosophical predilections. What that *Vēdānta* is, which was intended by Bādarāyaṇa to be taught by means of his *Sūtras*, is also dependent upon interpretation, although the interpreter's predilections cannot naturally have here quite as much scope for their manifestation as in the work of outlining the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*.

Such are some of the points which the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha* brings to notice. In a few places the translation has had to be more or less tentative, although the readings adopted in the body of the work have been chosen with considerable care. On the whole the translation is made to be as near to the original as possible, words and expressions introduced either for the sake of idiom or for the sake of clearness being invariably enclosed within brackets. This being the very first edition of the work as a whole, I am led to believe that scholars will not judge its shortcomings too severely, particularly because

I feel that the work cannot fail to be of some interest to them. It only remains for me to express my thanks to all those who have helped me in connection with the publication of this work and its English translation. My thanks are particularly due to Pandits Vēnkaṭṣvara Śāstrin and Śāthakōpācārya of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library at Madras, and to Mr. M. B. Varadarājaiyaṅgār, B.A., B.L., of Bangalore, and Mr. K. Kṛṣṇaswāmi Aiyāṅgār, B.A., of the Madras Christian College.

MADRAS,
18th June 1908.

M. RAṄGĀCĀRYA.



सत्यमेव जयते

SARVA-SIDDHANTA-SANGRAHA.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. (To that Being, who is variously understood by various philosophical controversialists in all (their several) systems of philosophy—to that same Being, who is indeed the one only *Brahman* to be realised in the *Vēdānta*, we offer our worship.

2. The auxiliary limbs (*Aṅgas* of the *Vēdas*), the secondary limbs (*Upāṅgas* thereof), and the supplementary *Vēdas* (*Upavēdas*) are all helpful to the *Vēdas* themselves. They form the sources of knowledge regarding duty (*dharmā*), wealth (*artha*), desire (*kāma*), and final deliverance (*mōkṣa*); and are fourteen in number.

3. The auxiliary limbs of the *Vēdas* are the following six, viz., the science of accent and phonetics (*śikṣā*), grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), etymology and interpretation (*nirukta*), astronomy (*jyōtiṣa*), ritual code (*kalpa*), and also prosody (*chandōviciti*).

4. The secondary limbs (of the *Vēdas*) are the following four, viz., *Mīmāṃsā*, *Nyāyasastra* (the science of reasoning), the *Purāṇas*, and the *Smṛtis*: these are in fact (the indirectly connected) outer limbs of the *Vēdas*.

5. The supplementary *Vēdas* are of four kinds: and they are *Āyurvēda* (science of medicine), *Arthavēda* (science of wealth and government), *Dhanurvēda* (archery and the science of war), and *Gāndharvavēda* (the science and art of music).

6. *Śikṣā* (or the science of accent and phonetics) teaches clearly the distinctive characteristics of *Vēdic* pronunciation. Grammar gives out the characteristics of words and their combinations,

7. The science of etymology and interpretation clearly teaches the derivations of the words to be found in them (*i.e.*, in the *Vēdas*). The science of astronomy mentions here (in relation to the *Vēdas*) the prescribed times for the performance of the (various) rites enjoined in the *Vēdas*.

8. The ritual code gives out the details of procedure in relation to (these) rites. Similarly the science of prosody (*chandōviciti*) teaches the number of the *mātrās* (moras) and syllables (to be contained in the various kinds of metrical stanzas).

9. The *Mīmāṃsā* is devoted to the enquiry into the meaning and aim of all the *Vēdas*. The aphorisms of *Nyāya* (the science of reasoning) deal with the characteristics of *pramāṇa* (an authoritative source of knowledge) and such other things.

10. The *Purāṇas* supplement and amplify (the *Vēdas* with) such *Vēdic* topics as belong to lost recensions of the *Vēdas*; and in the form of stories relating to great men, they (*i.e.*, the *Purāṇas*) urge on the pursuit of the true aims of life.

11. The *Dharma-sāstra* regulates, by means of the classification of right and wrong deeds as appertaining to the various classes of people and (their) stages of life, the duties to be performed (by all) in life, and deserves to be accepted and acted upon (by all).

12. By means of the sections relating to the causes (of diseases), to their symptoms and remedial medicines (respectively), the *Āyurvēda* points out what makes for length of life and for health: and accordingly it teaches all (persons) what they have to do (in order to live well).

13-14. The *Arthavēda* (the science of wealth and government) is devoted to (the study and examination of) that happiness which is consequent upon the (proper) distribution of food, drink, and such other things (among people). Among other things, by making available the *dakṣiṇā* (*i.e.*, the fee or any other gift to be given to officiating priests and others in sacrifices), the *ājya* (*i.e.*, the clarified butter to be used in sacrifices), the *purōḍāśa* (an oblation in the form of a cake made of ground rice cooked in an earthen dish), and the *caṇu* (an oblation of rice or barley boiled in milk and sprinkled over with ghee, etc.), as well as by safeguarding

them (from loss and destruction), it (*viz.*, the *Arthavēda*) is suited to bring about the fruition of those aims of life which make up the (well-known) collection of the four (well-known things). Here (in this world) the *Dhanurvēda* leads to the overthrow of enemies.

15. The employment of the seven notes of the gamut is in fact associated with both the *Sāma-vēda* and the *Gāndhārva-vēda* (music); and the combination of secular notes (as taught in the latter) is helpful to that of the *Vēdic* notes.

16-17. Thus it comes out that the (above-mentioned) limbs and secondary limbs (of the *Vēdas*), as well as the supplementary *Vēdas*, are all auxiliary and subordinate to the *Vēdas* themselves. Of these fourteen branches of knowledge, the *Mīmāṃsā* alone is the greatest. It consists of twenty chapters and is divided into two parts in accordance with the subject-matter dealt with therein. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* deals with the subject of *karma* (or ritualistic works) and extends over twelve chapters

18. The *sūtras* (or aphorisms) relating to this (*Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*) have been composed by Jaimini. The commentary (thereon) is the work of Śabara. The *Mīmāṃsārartika* is the work of Bhaṭṭa, as it has indeed been composed by the great teacher (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa.

19. The teacher Prabhākara, though his (*i.e.*, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's) disciple, established on a slight difference of views a different school (of *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*) from that of Śabara; and this is known as the *Prābhākara* school.

20. The *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* on the other hand consists of eight chapters; and it is also divided into two parts under the head dealing (respectively) with deities and with the wisdom (of true philosophy). Both these divisions of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* alike had their *sūtras* (aphorisms) composed by Vyāsa.

21. In the first four chapters here (in the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*) the deities referred to in the *mantras* are (given as) described by Saṅkarṣaṇa. For this reason it is called *Dēvatā-kāṇḍa* (*i.e.*, the part dealing with the deities).

22. A commentary (thereon) in four chapters has been composed by the venerable teacher. The explanatory commentary

which he produced in relation to that (other part of the *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*) is spoken of as *Vēdānta*.

23. Akṣapāda (or Gotama), Kaṇāda, and Kapila, and Jaimini, Vyāsa, and Patanjali—these authors of (philosophic) aphorisms are (all) believers in the *Vēdas*.

24. Brhaspati and the Ārhata (Jina) and the Buddha are all opposed to the (religious) path of the *Vēdas*.

In view of the (varying) fitness of individuals, all these have become expounders of authoritative systems (of religion and philosophy).

25. The *Bauddhas*, the *Lōkāyatās* (or the followers of Brhaspati) and the *Jainas* hold it as an established conclusion that the *Vēdas* are not authoritative. They have to be refuted by means of logical reasoning by all those who maintain the authoritativeness of the *Vēdas*.

Thus ends the first chapter—the Introductory one—in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.



CHAPTER II.

THE SYSTEM OF THE LŌKĀYATIKAS.

1. According to the doctrine of the *Lōkāyatikas*, the ultimate principles are merely the four elements, viz., earth, water, fire, and air, and there is nothing else.

2. Whatever is arrived at by means of direct perception, that alone exists. That which is not perceivable is non-existent, for the (very) reason that it is not perceived. And even those, who maintain the (real existence of) *adr̥ṣṭa* (the unperceivable), do not say that what has not been perceived has been perceived.

3. If what is rarely seen here and there is taken to be the unperceivable, how can they (really) call it as the unperceivable? How can that, which is always unseen, like the (ever unseen) horns of a hare, and other such things, be what is really existent?

4. In consequence of (the existence of) pleasure and pain, merit and demerit should not be here (in this connection) postulated by others. A man feels pleasure or pain by nature, and there is no other cause (for it).

5. Who colours wonderfully the peacocks, or who makes the cuckoos coo so well? There is in respect of these (things) no cause other than nature

6. The *ātman* (or self) is the body itself, which is characterised by such attributes as are implied in the expressions—‘I am stout’, ‘I am young’, ‘I am old’, ‘I am an adult’, etc. It is nothing else which is distinct from that (body).

7. That intelligence, which is found to be embodied in the (various) modified forms consisting of the non-intelligent elements—(that) is produced in the same way in which red colour is produced from the combination of betel, areca-nut and lime.

8. Higher than this world there is none. There is no *svarga* (or celestial world of enjoyment) and no hell. The world of Śiva and other such (worlds) are all invented by those who are

(followers of) other (systems of thought) than (what is followed by) ourselves and are (therefore) ignorant impostors.

9. The enjoyment of *svarga* consists in partaking of sweet food here, in enjoying the company of damsels of sixteen years of age, and also in enjoying the pleasures that are derivable from the use of fine clothes, sweet scents, flower garlands, sandal, and such other things (of delicious luxury).

10. The experience of (the miseries of) hell consists (only) in the pain caused by enemies, by injurious weapons, by diseases and other causes of suffering. The final beatitude of *mōkṣa* is, however, death (itself); and that consists in the cessation of (breath, the principal vital air).

11. Therefore it is not proper on the part of a wise man to take (any) trouble on account of this (final beatitude). It is only a fool that becomes thin and worn out to dryness by performing penances, and by fasting, etc.

12—15½. Chastity and other such (cunning) conventions have been invented by clever weaklings. Gifts of gold and of lands, etc., the enjoying of sweet dinners on invitation, are all the devices of persons who are poor and have stomachs that are (ever) lean with hunger. With respect to temples, houses for the distribution of drinking water to travellers, tanks, wells, pleasure-gardens, and other such devices—only travellers praise them daily, (but) not others. The ritual of *Āgnihōtra*, the three *Vēdas*, the (ascetic's) triple staff, the sneering of one's self with ashes are all (merely) means of livelihood to those who are destitute of intelligence and energy: so opines Brhaspati.

By adopting only those means which are seen (to be practical) such as agriculture, the tending of cattle, trade, politics and administration, etc., a wise man should always (endeavour to) enjoy pleasures (here) in this world.

Thus ends the second chapter, known as the system of the *Lōkāyatikas*, in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.

CHAPTER III.

THE SYSTEM OF THE ĀRHATAS OR JAINAS.

1. The doctrine of the *Lōkāyatikas* is liable to be objected to by all (other) philosophical controversialists. Now the Jaina, by (enunciating) his own doctrine, refutes their doctrine (thus).

2. The heat of fire, the cold of water, the sweet sound of the cuckoos, and such other things happen to be (due to) the invariable nature (of those things); and (they) are not anything else.

3. Pleasure and pain, which are transient, cannot be considered to constitute the nature of the *ātman* (self). By means of these two (viz., pleasure and pain), merit and demerit are determined to be the self's *adr̥ṣṭa* (or invisible results of works done in former states of re-incarnation). *मेव जयते*

4. The fault (in reasoning) pointed out by you (the *Lōkāyatika*), to the effect that, if what is unseen is in any way taken to be seen, then the unseen ceases to be the unseen, does not affect me (the Jaina), inasmuch as that (unseen) is established for me by means of the scripture.

5. And surely the inference of fire from smoke has been approved of by you also, who, on seeing the smoke, run near (to where it is) for the purpose of getting at the invisible fire.

6. Those persons who take their stand on the scriptures of the Jainas, come to know clearly (both) the seen and the unseen by such means as perception, inference, and scripture.

7. Human beings are of three kinds, namely, the perfected beings, the beings in (mundane) bondage, and the sufferers in hell. Some are (by their own nature) the highest of perfected

beings, (while) others (become so) with the aid of *mantras* (mystic magical formulas) and the power of sovereign herbs.

8. To any one in this world, who has adopted renunciation, freedom from (mundane) bondage results through the united operation of knowledge and works in the manner taught by the (great) spiritual preceptor.

9. Bondage in the case of the *Ārhatas* is that obstructive veil covering the knowledge of all things, which is (in the case of all of them) produced by the bodies acquired by them in consequence of (their) *karmas* (or the impressed effects of actions done in previous states of re-incarnation). And final liberation consists in the souls having no (such) veil of obstruction.

10. All bodies, with their organs (of sense, etc.) are made up of ultimate atoms, otherwise known as *pudgalas*, which follow (in the wake of) the merit and demerit (of beings).

11. The selves, which exist in the cages consisting of the bodies of creatures, beginning with worms and insects and ending with elephants, are of the size of their respective bodies; and they are attached to their bodies by reason of (their) ignorance.

12. In regard to the body, which is itself an obstructive covering for the *ātman*, there need not be any other covering such as a cloth, etc.; for, if such (a covering) is admitted (to be required), then in regard to this also (another covering will have to be admitted); and there will thus result the logical fallacy of a *regressus in infinitum*.

13. The *yōgins* (or the true seers of the self) do not cause pain to (any being in) the whole collection of living beings, in thought, or word, or deed; (they) assuredly move about as sky-clad (or naked) persons leading the life of celibacy.

14. They (carry) the feathers of peacocks in their hands, and are accomplished in adopting the various postures (prescribed for *yōgic* meditation), such as the 'posture of the hero', etc. They eat out of the 'vessels' consisting of (their own) hands, and have their hairs out, and are engaged in silent meditation.

15-15½. These sages are free from stains and are pure, and (are able to) destroy the multitude of sins appertaining to

those who bow unto them in reverence. That Omniscient Spiritual Teacher of the world, who is the bestower of the fruits of (even) their *mantras*, and is established as an authority on the road to final freedom—He is (certainly) worthy of being faithfully followed by all.

Thus ends the third chapter, known as the system of the *Ārhatas* (or Jainas), in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śāṅkarācārya.



CHAPTER IV.

THE SYSTEMS OF THE BAUDDHAS.

I.

THE SYSTEM OF THE *Mādhyamikas*.

1. Now the *Bauddhas* unhesitatingly discard the system promulgated even by the spiritual teacher of the Jainas, just as (they themselves discard) the doctrine of the *Lōkāyatas*.

2. By reason of the difference in views among the four (classes of the followers of Buddha), the scriptures of the *Bauddhas* are of four kinds; and they impel (men) to live (their lives) thus or thus, according to their (particular) fitness and qualifications.

3. What is known as 'intellect' is indeed 'consciousness' itself. It is not considered to be an internal instrument (of the mind), because (the expressions)—'He is aware' and 'He understands'—are (generally) used as if they are synonymous.

4. For three out of the (four) schools of *Bauddhas*, the understanding exists undisputedly (as a reality). In (the view of) only two of them, external objects exist (in reality). There is difference of opinion (among all of them) in respect of other things: and that is as follows.

5. That *Bauddha*, who is a *Vaibhāṣika*, declares that external objects are established through direct perception. But the *Sautrāntika* (Buddhist) says that external objects are (merely) such (things) as are inferred from the forms of consciousness.

6. The *Yōgācāra* (Buddhist) says that only consciousness is (real) here, and that nothing else (is real).

And the *Mādhyamika* (Buddhist) disputant says that in fact even consciousness does not exist (as a reality).

7. The *Mādhyamikas* consider that the ultimate principle is not existent, nor non-existent, nor existent-and-non-existent, nor

(anything else which is) different from both (the existent and the non-existent), and that it is (thus) outside the scope of (all these) four (possible) alternatives.

8. Whatever is non-existent, that cannot be produced by any cause, as, for instance, the (absolutely non-existent) horns of a hare (cannot at all be produced). If origination is admitted to be desirable in the case of what is (really) existent, then (in fact origination) produces (only) that which has been already produced.

9. It is impossible for one (and the same) thing to be both an entity and a non-entity. Nor does it stand to reason (to hold) that one (and the same) thing is distinct from (both) reality and unreality.

10-11. Therefore it is proved that the ultimate principle is such nothingness as is outside the scope of the four alternatives (above set forth). If, in the enquiry whether or not the generic configurations of things are different from the individuals characterised by those generic configurations, it be admitted that they are different, then those (generic configurations) have to be apprehended separately from the individuals, like the toes (for example, which are separately perceived in the body which is their possessor). That individuality which is self-evidently well established is (indeed) what belongs to the ultimate atoms.

12. The characteristics of ultimate atoms have to be described by the *Vaiśeṣikas* and others (like them). By (the atoms) having to come together at once in sixes, there would arise in relation to the ultimate atom the character (of its) being made up of six parts (or aspects).

13-16. If, however, (all the) six atoms happen to occupy the same space, a collection (of atoms) has to be of the same measure (in volume) as a (single) atom.

Are generic characteristics, such as Brahminhood, produced by the study of the *Vēdas*, or are they produced by means of (certain prescribed) sacraments, or by both (these means together)? This is all inappropriate. If it be by means of the study of the *Vēdas* that Brahminhood results, then a *Śūdra*, who, having gone to another province, learns the *Vēdas* well (there), may also

acquire Brahminhood. And here, in this world, no Brahmin is to be seen, who has (undergone) all the (required) sacraments, inasmuch as the sacraments prescribed for a Brahmin are in fact forty (in number). If one who has (undergone only) one sacrament might be a Brahmin, then all men would become Brāhmins.

17-17½. When it is (thus) demonstrated that there are not at all such things as constitute generic and specific configurations of characteristics, the principle of consciousness also ceases altogether to exist, since there arises as a consequence the (utter) absence of (all) objects that are to be known.

Such is the discussion conducted by the *Mādhyamikas* themselves in relation to (their own) ultimate principle of nothingness.

Thus ends the system of the *Mādhyamikas*.

II.

THE SYSTEM OF THE *Yōgācāras*.

1. The *Yōgācāra*, who maintains that consciousness exists quite independently (of the existence or otherwise of external objects), refutes the theory of nothingness stated thus by the nihilist *Mādhyamika*.

2. If all is mere nothingness as mentioned by you, then (your) nothing itself has to be the criterion of truth to you. Hence you cannot appropriately have any right of discussion with others (who hold something other than nothing to be such a criterion).

3. How do you then undertake to prove your own position and to disprove similarly the adversary's position? And why do you not here (in this case) argue, (as you well may), to the contrary?

4. What is of the nature of consciousness is indeed indivisible; but by those, whose vision is confused, it is seen to be, as it were, differentiated into the perceived object, the perceiving subject, and (then) the perception (itself).

5. The means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the resulting (knowledge), &c., have (all) been, in accordance with the (current) views regarding (the nature of) knowledge, stated

(to be different and separate in character). The ultimate truth also will be expounded, when (in fact) there arise qualified persons (to grasp it).

6. Indeed, there exists in reality (only) one thing, and that is of the nature of the intelligent principle of consciousness. And (its) oneness is not destroyed in consequence of the varied character of (its) manifestations.

7. In regard to one and the same body of a fine young woman, a religious ascetic, an amorous man, and a dog have (respectively) three different views, to the effect that it is a (mere) carcase, a beloved mistress, and a thing fit to feed upon.

8. If, nevertheless, that young woman (happens to be) only one, similarly is the ultimate principle of consciousness (only one) to us. Whatever else (is postulated) other than that, such as the (configurations of) generic characteristics, etc.—you may (freely) disprove (all) that.

9. Therefore consciousness, which is (fleeting and) momentary, and is (at the same time) wrongly differentiated in three ways by deluded persons——(that) alone is held in honour (as the one reality) by those, who have come to know (this) self-luminous principle, and are desirous of obtaining the salvation of final deliverance.

Thus ends the system of the *Yōgācāras*.

III.

THE SYSTEM OF THE *Sautrāntikas*.

1. Consciousness alone has here (in this system) been postulated by the clever *Yōgācāra*. There can be no perception without an object of perception. Therefore, according to us, external objects also exist (in reality).

2. According to the view of the *Sautrāntikas*, external objects are always inferred (to exist) by means of those differences (in perception) which consist of (many) wonderful varieties in forms of consciousness, such as blue, yellow, and so on.

3. The eye and the other (organs of sense) finally lose themselves in (apprehending) the five things, such as colour, etc. To him (*the Sautrāntika*), there is no sixth sense that apprehends what is external.

4. It is (surely) appropriate (enough) that you (first) postulate (the ultimate atom) to consist of six parts (or aspects), and then (give out) a refutation of the (atomic character of the) atom. Even according to that same (process of reasoning), if there be no external object, (then) there can be no perceptive knowledge (of objects).

5. The element (known as) *ākāśa* is declared by us (the *Sautrāntikas*) to be (the same as) the ultimate atom. It has to be merely a notion, and is not considered to be anything else.

6. All things are momentary (in point of existence), and are the result of the (varied) display of the forms of consciousness. Even those entities, which are (capable of being described definitely as) such and such, —(even they) are always inferred from the forms (of consciousness).

7. In our view, even though there is momentariness (in relation to things perceived), there is certainly (in consequence) no contradiction in (the fact of) their being objects of perception; for, to be an (external object (of perception) is to possess the character of such a cause, as is capable of bestowing a form upon consciousness.

Thus ends the system of the *Sautrāntikas*.

IV.

THE SYSTEM OF THE *Vaibhāṣikas*.

1. There is, in the theory of the *Vaibhāṣikas*, a slight difference from the theory of the *Sautrāntikas*. External objects are (generally proved to exist) by means of direct perception; but it is only here and there that they have to be (known) through inference.

2. It is only the ultimate atoms, gathered together by thousands in accordance with their special capacity to be in front or behind, that exist (for us) as the massive expanse of external objects.

3. Only at a distance does (a person) see a forest ; but on going near it, he sees no forest anywhere apart from (seeing) the creepers and the trees.

4. The clay comes to have the characteristics of the pot. But the pots (come to have) the characteristics of the potsherds, and the potsherds become (reduced into the state of) powdered particles ; and these (particles are finally reduced to) the condition of atoms.

5. Among all the four (schools of the) *Bauddhas* there is unanimity, in so far as the determination (of the nature) of the inner principle of the ego is concerned. They are in dispute with one another in consequence of (their) difference in view in regard to (the outer world of) common phenomenal experience.

6-7. The *Bauddhas* are those who take their stand on the *buddhi* (the intelligent principle of consciousness). The function of (this) consciousness is considered to be of two kinds, viz., the cognitional and the non-cognitional. Of these, they understand the cognitional (consciousness) to be the means here for the correct apprehension of truth. But the other (non-cognitional consciousness), which is dependent upon a fundamental non-discernment, is evolved out of the *skandhas*, the *āyatanas*, and the *dhātus* (or material components of the body), and is (as such) the source of nescience and does not form an authoritative criterion of truth.

8-10. According to all the *Bauddhas*, the whole collection of extended objects is (as it were) the body that constitutes the world ; here there are five *skandhas* and twelve *āyatanas* and similarly eighteen *dhātus*. The meaning of the word *skandha* is a 'group', and (it) indicates an aggregation of each of (what are called) *jñāna*, *saṃskāra*, *saṃjñā*, and also *vēdanā* and *rūpa*. Here it is only a series of *jñānas* (or states of consciousness) which is called *vijñāna-skandha* (or consciousness-collection).

11-12. The aggregate of the innate impressions (of merit and demerit due to *karma*) is what is called *saṃskāra-skandha*

(or impress-collection); and *vēdanā-skandha* (or the affection-aggregate) is stated to consist of those states of consciousness which constitute pleasure and pain, etc., as well as of that (state of consciousness) which constitutes desire. The *saṃjñā-skandha* (or the symbol-aggregate) is (made up of) what happens to be ' name '. The *rūpa-skandha* (or perception-aggregate) here is the collection of (all perceivable) embodied beings.

13—15. Pillars, pots, etc., which are all aggregates of embodied things, are made up of atoms.

(The qualities of) solidity, shape, etc., belong to (the element of) earth; and fluidity, etc., belong to (the element of) water. Heat belongs to the element of light, and cold to the element of air. From the putting together of colour, smell, taste, and heat, as (they) appertain to these four elements (above-mentioned), the earth, etc., are produced; and they are all aggregates of ultimate atoms.

The ear, the skin, the eyes, the tongue, and the nose are the five organs of knowledge.

16. (The organ of) speech, the feet, the hands, the anus, etc., are known as the five organs of action. The consciousness which is embodied in a collection (of atoms) is intelligence; and the *manas* is (its peculiar) instrument (for experiencing pain, pleasure, etc.).

17. (What is here taken as) the body, which is the same as the world, is, through deluded vision, imagined to be (of a) five-fold (composition), consisting of name, class (or genus), quality, substance, and action.

18-19. The criterion of truth as defined in the scriptures of the *Bauddhas* is held to be of two kinds. That is direct perception (properly), which is free from super-imposition and is undeluded. The super-imposition (here thought of) is, however, of five kinds, consisting of name, class, quality, substance, and action (respectively). Here (according to the *Bauddhas*), the nature of logical inference consists in (arriving at) the knowledge of what is characterised by the sign by means of the direct perception of (merely) the sign (itself).

20. Ignorance, which is of four kinds, is removed by means of these two criteria of truth (perception and inference). When (this) fourfold ignorance is destroyed, then the basic ignorance (relating to the common phenomenal apprehension of the universe) departs (as well).

21. When (this) basic ignorance ceases to be, (then) there arises a continuous flow of faultless states of consciousness; and final deliverance is declared by the sage Buddha to be nothing other than (such a flow of) faultless states of consciousness.

22. O ye, who are desirous of (attaining) true knowledge, listen to that supreme wisdom, which is free from the defects associated with birth, continuance and death, (that wisdom) which tears to the roots all attachments (giving rise to the bondage of *karma*) and is produced through (the living of) such (a life of) *yōga* as is characterised by the giving up of (all) likes and dislikes—(listen to that) supreme wisdom which is neither correlated to existence nor to non-existence, (to that) which is free from all intrinsic duality and is unequalled, (to that) which is pure like the firmament (on high) and is the source of (all) wealth—(listen to that).

23. The Divine Lord, who has been declared (to exist) by the *Vaiśeṣikas* and others, whose aim is (merely to indulge in) excessive flattery, is not admitted by us. Now, He is disproved (by us thus).

24. He who knows the truth regarding what is (morally) worthy of acceptance and what worthy of rejection, and also knows the means for the attainment of final deliverance, he alone is our authority, (but) not that Omniscient Being who is mentioned by you.

25. A man may 'see' things at a distance, or he may not. He may very well 'see' the truth he wishes (to see). If he who can see far is to be (our) authority, then we (may as well) worship eagles (which are known to be able to see very far).

26. Is there any one who knows the number of ants, etc., in a country? The creatorship of all things, which is declared by you to belong to the Divine Lord, is not (logically) maintainable.

27. If He be the agent in relation to (the production of) all things, then He leads men to the practice of unrighteousness (also). (Thus) urging men to do what is improper, how can He lead them to do (only) that which is proper?

28. In relation to him who is bad, indifference should be the proper attitude to be maintained by those who are good. (Surely) it is not a good deed on the part of the good to put salt into a cut wound.

29. If the Divine Lord Himself is the authoritative producer of all (your) religious scriptures, how can His language, wherein the former part is contradicted by the latter, prove authoritative?

30. If He induces men to do only that which is virtuous, then He becomes the promulgator of only one (kind of) scripture. How (then) can the creatorship of all things be predicated of Him who is (thus) effective (only) in part?

31. Does the Lord create the world with some profitable object in view, or (does He do it) without any such (object)? If He desires (any advantage to Himself), then He is imperfect. If He does not, He need not take up the work (of creation) at all.

32. Does your 'Lord', like a deluded fool, undertake to do that which is profitless? What (for instance) is the use of making the excreta, etc., of sheep, etc., round (in shape)?

33. If His activity (in relation to creation) be for mere diversion, then does He play like a child? To Him who plays always (thus), pain alone turns out to be the (ultimate) result in abundance.

34. This ignorant creature (man) is powerless in regard to his own pleasures and pains. Being (unavoidably) impelled by the Lord, he may go either to paradise or to hell.

35. In the hell, which is full of suffering, living creatures are alas! torn away (as it were) from their lives by means of the heat of red hot iron, etc., by the Lord, who is desirous of enjoying just a little pleasure of diversion (thus).

36. If He is able to bestow boons (freely), He may bestow (the boon of) paradise on one who commits such (offences) as the killing of a Brahmin, and bestow hell on one who performs the *sōma* sacrifice.

37. If He bestows gifts according to the *karmas* (of individuals), then all men may (well) be Lords (like Him). Being devoid of freedom in the matter of bestowing gifts, how is He to be called the Lord of all?

38. The Omniscient Lord, who is accepted by the *Naiyāyikas* and others, is (apt to be) refuted thus. Hence the sage Buddha, who alone knows what is (morally) worthy of adoption and what worthy of rejection, has to be accepted (by all as a true teacher and guide).

39. One should offer worship to the sanctuary. (Worship of) the sanctuary and other (such) duties, prescribed in the scriptures promulgated by the Buddha, have (all) to be performed ; but not sacrifices, etc., which are taught in the *Vēdas* and other (allied) scriptures.

40. The *Bauddhas*, beginning with the *Vaibhāṣikas*, take their stand (respectively) on action, on divinity, on (the practice of) meditation and mental concentration (*yōga*), and on nothingness. They (the *Bauddhas*) are only (of) four (kinds).

Thus ends the system of the *Vaibhāṣikas*, among the doctrines adopted by the *Bauddhas*.

The theories of the *Lōkāyatas*, *Ārhatas*, *Mādhyaṃikas*, *Yōgācāras*, *Sautrāntikas* and *Vaibhāṣikas*—which are six in number—are now concluded here.

Thus ends the fourth chapter, known as the theory of the *Bauddhas* in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.

CHAPTER V.

THE SYSTEM OF THE *VAISĒṢIKAS*.

1. Now, the *Vaiśeṣika*, who upholds the teachings of the *Vēdas*, refutes (the position of) the *Bauddhas*, the *Lōkāyatikas* and the *Ārhatas*, who are all atheistic and outside the pale of the *Vēdas*.

2. The *Bauddhas* and the others, who have strayed away from the path of the *Vēdas*, are worthy of honour (only) in (those other systems (of theirs)). Those worthy persons do not, however, constitute Brahmins.

3. Therefore, the *Bauddhas* and the others, through (their) reproach of the *Vēdas* and the Brahmins, proclaim always and everywhere (their own) pitiable self-deception.

4. The *Vēdas* alone constitute (as revealed scripture) the authoritative criterion of truth, because they have been produced by the Lord of all. According to the logic of elimination, He alone is to the individual souls the giver of the fruits of (their) works.

5. The individual souls, or (their) works, or *prakṛti* (nature), or the ultimate atoms are none of them capable of bestowing here (in this world) the fruits of works on individual souls.

6. If individual souls be themselves capable of obtaining the fruits of works, then let them, being such as are (naturally) devoted to their own happiness, prevent by means of (their own) efforts the unwished-for miseries (that often befall them).

7. Works (*karmas*) are here incapable of bestowing their own fruits on individual souls; because they (the works) are non-intelligent, and so have no access to (the power to bestow) *svarga* and other such regions as are (won as) the fruit of works.

8. Owing to its being non-intelligent, it is impossible for the *prakṛti* (also) to be the giver of the fruits (of *karma*). The ultimate atoms, which (too) are non-intelligent, are unable to give (to any one) the fruits (of *karma*).

9. Time also is non-intelligent, and so it surely cannot bestow on them (the individual souls) the fruits of their *karma*. Therefore (some) other Being, who is different from all these, happens to be the giver of the fruits (of *karma*).

10. And such a Being, knowing as He does all the various living creatures and the places wherein they reside, has to be admitted to be the Omniscient One. (But) those others, whom the *Bauddhas* and others approve of, cannot be (so accepted).

11. He who does not know all the living beings in the world, but only knows what (in life) is (morally) worthy of acceptance and what worthy of rejection, and has (therefore) the scope (of his knowledge) limited—(he) is not different from such as are like ourselves and is not (hence) omniscient.

12. On knowing (the truth of) that one part of the *Vēdas*, which teaches about the production of (the visible) showers of rain by means of the sacrifice known as *Kār̥ṛiṣṭi*, it becomes necessary to place faith in those invisible things (known as) *svarga* (paradise) and *apavarga* (the final bliss of soul-deliverance).

13. In determining (the truth regarding) the unseen (results of *Vēdic* works), the shower of rain declared (to be produced) by (the performance of) that sacrifice, which is known as *Kār̥ṛiṣṭi*, has to be noted. The attainment of sons and cattle from the performance of the sacrifice known as *Citrā* and other such sacrifices has (also) to be noted in determining (the truth of) the unseen results (of *Vēdic* works).

14–15. In relation to (the items of) time specified in astrology, the proof thereof is in the (timely occurrence of the) eclipse. Whatever the *Bauddhas* and others (like them) have taught to the effect that (all) such things are (wholly) authoritative as are (well) known (to be) partially (true),—that has been stolen from the *Vēdas* by (these) deceivers of the whole world. After learning the grammar of the hymns (of the *Vēdas*), other (similar) hymns were composed anew by them.

16. Magically effective charms produced by the bringing together of (suitable) letters—(they also) were similarly produced (anew by them). (On the other hand) nothing that has been seen

(to occur in their own scriptures) has been stolen from the scriptures of the *Bauddhas* by those who are the followers of the *Vēdas*.

17. Because the six auxiliary-science-members, beginning with the science of phonetics and pronunciation, belong only to the *Vēdas*, they do not form (such) members of other scriptures (than the *Vēdas*). It is nowhere stated (to be so), even by those who are other (than the followers of the *Vēdas*).

18. Therefore it is that the *Vēdas* are more powerful (as authorities) than the (whole) collection of all the works of authority belonging to the atheists. The *Vaiśeṣikas* consider that the beatitude of final deliverance (*mōkṣa*) results from the knowledge of the six categories.

19—22. The Lord, the individual souls, and the whole of this world are (all) comprised within those (categories). Here (in this system) are given (these) six categories, namely, substance, quality, action, generality, which is higher as well as lower, and intimate relation. According to the view of these (*Vaiśeṣikas*), there are nine substances, namely, earth, water, light, air and ether, space, time, soul and mind. Earth possesses (the quality of) smell; water has (the quality of) taste; to light belongs (the quality of) illumination; air is neither hot nor cold to the touch; and *ākāśa* has sound for its (attributive) quality. Space is that which is indicated by the ideas of East and West; and time is that which is arrived at by means (of the ideas) of quickly and slowly.

23. The soul is proved by the I-idea; and *manas* (the faculty of attention) is understood to be the internal organ (of the soul). Qualities abide in substances, so that they are (to be perceived) not in dissociation (from substances), nor in association with anything other (than substances).

24—27. (These) qualities are divided into twenty-four. And they are in order as follows: sound, touch, taste, colour (or form), smell, conjunction, speedfulness, number, fluidity, impressed innate influence, dimension, dividedness, effort, pleasure, pain, desire, intellect, aversion, severalty, priority, posteriority, merit and demerit and heaviness. These are the twenty-four qualities. And then action is of five kinds, namely, expansion, contraction,

throwing upwards, locomotion, and throwing downwards. Generality is here (in this school) known to be of two kinds, namely, the higher and the lower.

28-29. The higher (or the more comprehensive) one is the generality denoted by existence, etc., while the lower (or the comparatively less comprehensive) one is known to be such as substantiality (for instance). Those things, by means of which the mutual distinctions among the substances here are made out, are to be understood as forming particularities; and these (particularities) inhere only in substances. Intimate relation is the relation of substances with (such things as) qualities, etc.

30. These six categories (of things) comprise (within themselves all) the objects of knowledge. The whole world is made up of them. The realisation of their similarities and dissimilarities is the means of attaining the salvation of final deliverance.

31. The *ātman* (self), which is located within (material) substances, is itself of (two) different kinds in the form of the individual soul and of the Supreme Soul. The gods, men, and the lower animals are (all) individual souls, and the Great Lord is the other (kind of *ātman*).

32-34. (That person), who performs the duties enjoined by Him, he is freed (from the bondage of *samsāra*); but the other person (who does not perform such duties) is bound down (in bondage). The *Vēdas*, the *Smṛtis*, the *Itihāsas*, etc., the *Purāṇas*, the *Mahābhārata*, etc., have all to be understood as constituting the commandment of the Lord; and (this commandment) should not be transgressed at any time by those who are believers in the *Vēdas*. The criteria of truth are of three kinds, namely, perception, inference, and scripture. The Creator of the World is made out (to exist) by means of these three criteria of truth. Therefore the works enjoined by Him have to be performed for the purpose of satisfying Him solely.

35. This divine and supreme Lord may be made to become pleased only by means of loving devotion. From His grace results the beatitude of final deliverance, which consists in the cessation of the activity of the instruments (of the soul).

36. On the cessation of the activity of (its) instruments, the soul exists in a condition similar to that of a stone. To us, the destruction of pleasure (also) is, like the destruction of pain, accomplishable with difficulty.

37-37½. Therefore, after becoming (thus) disgusted with (the) life of (*samsāra*, the person, who is desirous of attaining final freedom, obtains the (wished-for) deliverance.

Hereafter the *Naiyāyika* will prove by means of logical reasoning what is good and acceptable to us (as philosophical controversialists): for, the views (of both) of us, who uphold the *Vēdas* (alike), do not differ very materially.

Thus ends the fifth chapter, known as the system of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.



CHAPTER VI.

THE SYSTEM OF THE NAIYĀYIKAS.

1. The theory of the *Naiyāyika* is briefly expounded now —(the theory of him), through whose logical reasoning the *Vēdas* devoured by the wretched heretic folk have been saved (from destruction).

2—5. Akṣapāda (Gautama) declares that the salvation of final deliverance results to individual souls from the knowledge of the sixteen topics beginning with *pramāṇa* (the means of proof). These are—the means of proof, the object of knowledge, settled conclusion, and the other thing—doubt, purpose (or motive), example, demonstration, premiss, reasoning, discussion, controversy, cavilling, fallacy, perversion, self-confutation, and also final refutation. There are four means of proof here (in this system), viz., perception and what is called inference, comparison (or analogy), and scripture. Comparison, however, is not admitted by some (as a means of proof). Perception is (firstly) that of ourselves and of others (similar to us); and there is also (secondly) another (kind of it), viz., that of the *yōgins* (or transcendental seers).

6—8. The *yōgins* see all things by means of the grace of the Lord. The Lord naturally sees all things with His eye of knowledge. The beings with the eye of flesh do not realise the Lord of all even with (great) effort. It is (however) clear that the following syllogism proves the Lord:—All things such as the earth, the mountains, etc., are understood to have an Omniscient Being as the cause (of their creation); because they are all, like pots (for instance), produced effects. It is thus that the Creator of the world is inferred.

9. If it be said that, in regard to the earth, etc., their being produced effects is (itself) not proved, then that also, namely, their being produced effects, may be proved by means of (the fact of)

their being made up of component parts, in the manner of pots, walls, etc., (which are all made up of component parts).

10. In relation to (the possession of) the physical body, etc., as seen (in the case of the makers of pots, makers of walls, etc.) in the above illustrative example, the question of merit and demerit (as determining the material embodiment of a soul) arises (as a matter of course). From this circumstance, no particular objection can in any respect be raised here by Bhaṭṭa and others (in relation to the proof of the world-creating Lord).

11. Any such objection is not valid (as regards God), because there is (the appropriateness of His) belonging to a class which may be (either) superior (or) equal (to that of the makers of pots and the makers of walls, etc.). What is really inferred here is simply the creatorship (of the Lord) purely from the fact of (the world) being a produced effect.

12. If you raise any objection (to this) with the aid of (any) such peculiarities as may be found in the (given illustrative) examples, then there will also be room (even in the reasoning accepted by you) for the negation of the inference of fire from smoke.

13. The Lord Śiva, even though He has no body, performs work here, out of (His own free) will, in the same manner in which a person, without necessarily requiring (another) body (as instrument), makes his own body move.

14. The attributes of the great Lord are these three, namely, desire, knowledge and effort. These may, like the essential characteristics of atoms, exist even where there is no (built-up) body.

15. No effect is here produced without (a producing) action; and it is proved by us that this action has to be preceded by effort, because it has the character of an action like the actions of persons like us.

16. That enunciation of the non-existence of the Lord, which has been made (by our opponent), has been (thus) disproved through (the process of) elimination, by taking into account the appropriateness of the earth, etc., being such produced effects as can be caused (only) by the activity of One who is omniscient.

17. That logic by which the *Vaiśeṣika* has proved the Lord God through the process of elimination—that has to be adopted here (by us also). In this respect, both our systems are alike.

18. Because time, *karma*, *prakṛti*, etc., are non-intelligent, the Lord Śiva is different (from them). And because individual souls are all possessed of very limited knowledge, He (the Lord Śiva) has to be accepted as no other than an Omniscient Being.

19. The authoritativeness of the *Vēdas* is accepted, because they have been brought out by the Omniscient Lord. The authoritativeness of the *Smṛtis* and such other (sacred writings) results from their being based upon these (*Vēdas*).

20. *Svarga* (or the celestial world of enjoyment) and the final salvation of the soul's deliverance (*apavarga*) come only to those who faithfully perform the *karmas* (or works) which are ordained in the *Vēdas* and in the *Smṛtis*; but they (viz., *svarga* and *apavarga*) never come to the heretics anywhere.

21. The Lord Śiva is described also in the *Trīyambaka-mantra* and other such (*mantras*) by means of such things as are (calculated) to remind one of what is good to be adopted in the (daily) practice of religion.

22. It has been explained by means of reasoning and other such (aids) that, on observing among other things the shower of rain as the visible result of the performance of the sacrifice known as *Kāṛīrīṣṭi*, faith has to be placed in these (two) unseen things, namely, *svarga* (heavenly paradise) and *apavarga* (the final deliverance of the soul).

23. The whole lot of the scriptures produced by Buddha and others (like him) is unauthoritative like the language of the insane, because those scriptures have been composed by persons who were not wise and trustworthy.

24. What the thorny hedge is for the protection of the growth of (the crops raised from) the seeds (sown in the fields), that the hedge consisting of logical reasoning is for the safeguarding of the truths expounded in the *Vēdas*.

25. Logical reasoning supports right knowledge; and it is associated with three processes of dialectics. These dialectic

processes are understood to be only three, viz., discussion, controversy and cavil.

26. A discussion is (that which is carried on) by the student with the teacher with the object of learning the truth. Neither victory nor defeat is (the aim) here. Both these (arise as aims), however, in relation to controversy and cavil.

27. In regard to controversy, as also in regard to cavil, there are four constituent requisites, viz., a disputant, a counter-disputant, a questioner, and a president of the assembly (wherein the parties carry on their dialectic contests).

28. The counter-disputant, whenever he is in dread of defeat due to his (own) ignorance of the appropriate answer, should conquer the disputant either by (the process of) perversion or by (the pointing out of) self-confutation and other such defects (in his arguments).

29. In regard to the person who utilises (in his arguments the process of) perversion or (the pointing out of) self-confutation, one should set up a final refutation. That which puts an end to a dialectic exposition is said to be the final refutation.

30—33. Of these, (the trick of) perversion is of three kinds, being based on the secondary sense of words, on their general significance, or on the (ambiguity of the) language (used by the opponent). When it is said by a disputant that a certain *dvija* (or twice-born Brahmin) knows (all) the four *Vēdas*, if the opponent finds fault with this, taking for the purpose a general view (of the situation), and says—“Is this anything wonderful? To be the knower of the four *Vēdas* is quite in keeping with (his) being a Brahmin (*dvija*)”—then, as a refutation (of this position), its over-comprehensiveness should be brought out by means of (appropriately argumentative) sentences. When a disputant gives out (for instance)—“This *Vēdic* student is a *nava-vastra*”,* there would be verbal perversion (in the controversy)

* The word *nava* means both ‘new’ and ‘nine’ in Sanskrit, so that a *nava-vastra* may be either ‘he who has a new cloth’ or ‘he who has nine cloths.’ The speaker here uses the expression in the former sense, but his opponent purposely misunderstands him in the latter sense.

there, if the speaker is refuted (by his opponent) by saying—“Where are the nine cloths of this (student)?” By reason of its being opposed to the intended purport (of the speaker, this sort of reply) stultifies the meaning aimed at (by him).

34. An argument which is destructive of one's own (position), or a reply which is well capable of being found fault with—that is self-confutation. This consists of twenty-four varieties.

35. Where a counter-disputant employs the twenty-four kinds of (arguments leading to) self-confutation and thus gives erroneous answers, what has to be urged (to put him down) is final refutation.

36—38. The various kinds of self-confutation are (dependent upon) what follow: likeness, unlikeness, equality, superiority, inferiority, describability and indescribability, alternative supposition, applicability, inapplicability, and the process of accomplishing the end in view, incident, counter-illustration, ineffectiveness, doubt, presumption from circumstances, uniformity, and what are called logical proof and inconclusive argument, action, perceptibility, the invariable and the variable. Since these happen to be the means of giving rise to (the sense of) sameness (in relation to both the sides of an argument), they are (also) known as the (different) kinds of ‘sameness’ (in dialectics).

39—40. When there is complete ignorance of the right answers (to be given in an argument), absolute defeat will be the result. Accordingly, (even) by means of controversy and cavil, one has to refute those who are outside the pale of the *Vēdas*, and then, for the purpose of satisfying the Lord God, one has to perform only such works as are enjoined in the *Vēdas*. By means of the power of *yōga* (meditation and mental concentration) obtained through His grace, he, who is desirous of obtaining the final deliverance of his soul, will obtain (that) deliverance.

41—43. In the condition of final release there will be the experience of eternal bliss without (any perception whatsoever of) sense-objects.

I choose to be a fox in the beautiful *Bṛndāvana* in preference to that altogether blissless salvation of soul-deliverance, which has

been taught by the *Vaiśeṣika*, who, by means of the sacrifices prescribed in the *Vēdas* and by means of the grace of the Lord, wishes to attain with great effort the (altogether feelingless) state of a swoon, a condition of existence similar to that of a stone. Indeed, it has been already stated that the final deliverance (of the soul) results from that *yōga*, which is the outcome of loving devotion directed to Hari (or the God Viṣṇu).

44-44½. *Yōga* has eight essential constituents, namely, internal self-restraint, external restraint of conduct, assumption of postures, controlling of the breath, drawing the senses into the mind within, and sustained attention, and intense meditation, and self-realisation. The *Sāṅkhya* will explain these at length.

Thus ends the sixth chapter, known as the theory of the *Naiyāyikas*, in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.



CHAPTER VII.

THE THEORY OF PRABHĀKARA.

1. Now, the theory of the teacher Prabhākara, who, even out of rivalry with his (own) preceptor, extolled the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, will be briefly described.

2-3. According to (this) teacher, there are five categories, namely, substance, quality, action, generality and subordination—which, along with power, similarity and number, are understood to be (altogether) of eight different kinds : there is no particularity, and there is no non-existence as apart from the (correlated) surface of the earth, etc. : and only that work which is ordained in the *Vēdas* can be the bestower of the salvation of soul-emanicipation, and no other (work is capable of being the bestower of such salvation).

4-6. Indeed, he becomes subject to bondage, who performs such *karmas* as have desirable (selfish) objects in view, or such (*karmas*) as are prohibited (in the scriptures). The (contents of the) *Vēdas* are divisible into four kinds, as *vidhis* (or mandatory injunctions), *arthavādas* (or explanatory disquisitions), *mantras* (or metrical hymns), and *nāmathēyas* (or names). These (*Vēdas*) have the mandatory injunctions as their important subject-matter, and teach us what constitute (our) duties as well as what do not constitute (our) duties. Such injunctions—as ‘ The *ātman* (or self) has to be known ’—are contained in the *Āruṇa* (that is, in the *Upaniṣads*), and clearly enjoin there (the acquisition of) the knowledge of the self as it really is. The *ātman* (or self) is different from the intellect, the senses, and the body, and is all-pervading and unchanging.

7. In the cognition of objects, it appears to be varied in form in relation to every one of the (many) fields (of objective cognition). In (the perception)—“ I know the pot well ”—surely there arises to a person at once a threefold cognition.

8. Indeed, to the (perceiving) person, the pot appears as constituting the object of knowledge, the agential subject of knowledge (appears) as derived from the ego-idea, and the knowledge (itself appears) as a self-luminous something.

9-10. The *Vaiśeṣika* has declared that the final deliverance of the soul results from the cessation of the activities of the instruments (of the soul). Accordingly, he, being anxious to cross the shoreless ocean of unendurable *samsāra*, wishes to attain that (final) deliverance of the soul, which is (merely) a state of existence similar to that of a stone, and is the outcome of the destruction of volitional effort, pleasure, pain, desire, merit, demerit, etc.

11. The destruction of pleasure, which is (itself) achieved with pain, is as desirable as the destruction of pain (itself). The experience of eternal bliss cannot, moreover, be admitted in relation to the attributeless (soul).

12. One should not create a change of view in (the minds of) those ignorant persons who are attached to *karma* (or ritualistic work). The path to be adopted by those who have renounced the world is different; (and that) is not at all suited to those who are devoted to (ritualistic) work.

13. Therefore, considering that they are enjoined (in the scripture), sacrifices and other religious duties have (all) to be performed. Otherwise, the harm of sinfulness will befall those who are qualified only to live the life of (ritualistic) works.

14. Those, who solely depend upon (such) works alone, will (also) attain unsurpassable good (in the end). There is (in fact) no superior deity other than what is aimed at by the use of the ending of the fourth (or dative) case.

15. On the lines laid down by his preceptor, Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila), this teacher Prabhākara set at naught (all) those who (then) stood outside the pale of the *Vēdas*, and promulgated (his) authoritative teaching in relation to those who are qualified (merely) for (the life of ritualistic) works.

Thus ends the seventh chapter, known as the theory of Prabhākara, in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha*, composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SYSTEM OF (KUMĀRILA) BHATṬĀCĀRYA.

1. The great teacher Bhaṭṭa, who was a particular incarnation of Kumāra (the war-god), established well on earth the (religious) path of the *Vēdas*, which had been in fact set at naught by the *Bauddhas* and other atheists in former times.

2. On giving up both those (kinds of) works, which have (either) the attainment of particular desired objects in view, or are prohibited by the scripture, the wise man, whose mind is purified, attains the highest bliss through performing such works as are ordained (in the scripture).

3. The results of the works, that have particular desired objects in view, have, in accordance with those (very) works having (such) specially desired objects in view, to be enjoyed only after being born again by (those) men who perform the works with specially desired objects in view.

4. But he, who performs the works prohibited by the scripture, has, after being born in the form of worms, insects, etc., to enjoy the (bitter) fruits of forbidden works, and has to go lower and lower down into hell.

5. Therefore, both duty and non-duty have to be (clearly) made out by the wise man after due enquiry. Both of them have scriptural injunction as their authoritative basis, and do not fall within the scope of perception and such other (criteria of truth).

6. The *Vēdas* contain four different kinds (of topics), namely, *vidhi* (or mandatory injunctions), *arthavāda* (or explanatory disquisitions), *mantra* (or metrical hymns), and *nāmadhēya* (or names). The *Vēdas* have the mandatory injunctions for their chief subject-matter, and thus teach us (mainly) about duties and non-duties.

7. That (kind of) sentence in the *Vēdas* happens to be a commandment, which turns men away from what is forbidden, or

makes them become engaged in the performance of prescribed duties ; and it is indicated by means of the potential mood, the imperative mood, the potential passive participles and other (similar verbal forms).

8. Whatever sentence here (in the *Vēdas*) censures forbidden things or praises such things as are enjoined—that is an *arthavāda* : it has the force of an authoritative means of knowledge, for the reason that it forms an auxiliary part of injunctions.

9. *Mantras* are those constituent elements of (ritual) works, which throw light on what has to be accomplished (through such works). Those things which happen to be the names of sacrifices, etc., in the *Vēdas*, they are the *nāmadhēyas* in fact.

10. The injunction—"The *ātman* (or self) has to be known"—and other (similar injunctions) which are given in the *Āraṇas* (or *Upaṇiṣads*) enjoin on individual souls the knowledge relating to the *Brahman* who is the Supreme Soul.

11. On the strength of the two (following) logical syllogisms, the *Bauddhas* distinctly find fault even with the *Vēdas* : and the denial of the duties, etc., which are derived from those (*Vēdas* themselves) as source, follows (thence) as a matter of course.

12. (Firstly), the *Vēdas* are no authoritative means of knowledge, because they possess the characteristics of spoken sentences, (even) like the sentences of the man in the street. Again (they are not authoritative) because they are the productions of unwise and untrustworthy persons, like the speech of the insane.

13. This (argument) is not right : the two reasons given above are quite ineffective (here). Simply because they (the *Vēdas*) happen to be (made up of) sentences, it does not follow that the *Vēdas* have not the character of an authoritative means of knowledge.

14. The (other) reason given by you, to the effect that they are composed by unwise and untrustworthy persons, is (also) useless (here). Want of authoritativeness (in relation to ordinary utterances) may well result from the mere fact of (their) having been uttered by an unwise and untrustworthy person. But it cannot be so in the case of revealed scriptures.

15. The character of being produced by unwise and untrustworthy persons cannot (at all) become (associated as) a blemish with the eternal *Vēdas*. In regard to human utterances, (however), there may always be the faults of deceitfulness, etc., (in association with them).

16—19. As (we hold that) the *Vēdas* are not personal productions, we have no suspicion of any faultiness whatsoever (in relation to them). A few *Naryāyikas* and others, who believe in the authoritativeness (of the *Vēdas*) on account of their having been given out by the Lord, take objection to the view that the *Vēdas* do not possess the characteristics of personal productions, (and say) that the *Vēdas* are to them of (divinely) personal origin, inasmuch as they possess the character of (being made up of) sentences like the *Bhārata* and other such works, and that (nevertheless) the authoritativeness (of the *Vēdas*) is also well established in that they have been produced by the Lord of all. In regard to (all) works of personal origin, it is right to ask whether or not there is authoritativeness (in them). There being no speaker in respect of the (original productive utterance of the) *Vēdas*, even such a talk (about authoritativeness) is impossible (in relation to them). The eternality which is predicated of the *Vēdas* (by us) is (therefore) utilised to establish their authoritativeness.

20. (To hold) that the reason of the authoritativeness (of the *Vēdas*) is (to be found) entirely in their being produced by the Lord of all—that is not right. With the help of which criterion of truth is the Lord in this connection assumed to exist?

21. If He be so assumed with the aid of scripture, then (it is asked) whether the scripture is eternal or non-eternal. If it be eternal, then what is (the meaning of) this assumption of the agency of the Lord in regard to it (as a thing produced by Him)?

22—23 In regard to the view (that the scripture is) non-eternal, there will arise the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. That the authoritativeness of the scripture is due to its being the language of the Lord, and that the Lord is (in His turn) established by means of that same scripture, is accordingly the fallacy

of reciprocal dependence (here). Therefore, it is well established that the *Vēdas* are possessed of authoritativeness altogether in themselves.

24-25. Further, it is also (thus) established that (the teachings bearing upon) duty and non-duty fall entirely within the scope of the *Vēdas*. It may, however, be objected (here) that, (even) without the *Vēdas*, the *yōgins* perceive directly and clearly (what is) *dharma* (or duty), in the manner of (other persons perceiving) the fruit of the emblic myrobalan when placed on the palm of the hand. How (then) can the *Vēdas* be the sole source of authority (in relation to duty)? It is not right to say so (in objection); the *yōgin* cannot be different in nature from such as are like ourselves.

26-31. He also perceives objects with the help of the five senses and does not go beyond. Perception and what is called inference, and then comparison (or analogy), presumption from circumstances, and also the negative proof of non-perception—(these) do not indeed teach us duty. Perception, which gives rise to the knowledge of existing things by means of the contact of the several senses (with them), cannot surely apprehend that which has passed away or that which has not (yet) arrived. Owing to the non-existence of anything which has the character of being an invariable concomitant of *dharma* (or duty), inference also does not evidently give rise to the knowledge of duty and non-duty. As there is nothing (at all) anywhere which resembles duty, etc., comparison (or analogy), which (only) apprehends similarities, cannot be the means of making out duty and non-duty. If, by means of the evidence of circumstantial presumption, only a general proposition is arrived at to the effect that duty is the cause of pleasure and non-duty (the cause) of pain, there is nothing wrong (in it). (But) a general rule cannot be put into practice. Moreover, (such a rule) may then be found to be too late (in coming, when duty has to be actually judged by its result).

32-33. Sacrifices, etc., are (all) to be adopted in practice, being the particular things enjoined by the mandatory injunctions (in the *Vēdas*). The (negative) proof of non-perception cannot throw light on merit (as associated with duty) and on demerit (as

associated with non-duty); because it is always in the absence of the (first) five means of knowledge that this (negative proof of non-perception) has scope to operate. Therefore, it is established that duty and non-duty fall exclusively within the scope (of the authority) of the *Vēdas*.

34. The work which is enjoined exclusively by the *Vēdas* yields the salvation of final deliverance; and none other than that (yields such deliverance). Therefore, one who is desirous of final deliverance, should not, in respect of this matter, be engaged (either) in those (activities) which have particular objects of desire in view or in those which are prohibited (by the *Vēdas*).

35—38. One should perform the daily obligatory and the occasionally obligatory (works) with the object of avoiding the harm of sinfulness that will (otherwise) arise. In regard to the Supreme Self taught in (the scriptural injunction)—“The *Ātman* (or Self) should be known, etc.”—the knowledge (of that Supreme Self) is certainly (capable of being) born in the individual selves. The *ātman* (or the self) of him, who performs the works enjoined (in the scripture) and practises the *yōga* consisting of *pratyāhāra* and the other constituent elements, is (indeed) realised at last through direct perception (by him) with the aid of the (internal) organ of *manas* (or the faculty of attention) as the instrument. The *ātman* is both differentiated and undifferentiated, and is like the (conception of the) ox, (for instance), both real and unreal. Although (the *ātman* is) differentiated when in the form of individual souls, yet He is undifferentiated as the Supreme (Soul)—is unreal in the form of individual selves and real in the form of the Supreme (Self).

39. Just as the generic characteristics of the ox are made out only in relation to particular oxen characterised by the variegated colour (and the other colours), so the Supreme Soul also has to be understood to exist as if continuously threaded through (all) the individual souls.

40. By means of the *mantras* known as *traiyambaka*, etc., He is to be worshipped and meditated upon by all those who are desirous of (the salvation of) final release. He (who thus worships

and meditates upon (God) obtains the (blessed) condition of true self-abidance, even by meditating upon Him as possessed of (some) super-imposed form.

41-41½. In the state of final deliverance, there occurs, (even) in the absence of the objects of the senses, the experience of the highest bliss. Through (this) experience of eternal bliss, all those, who are desirous of (the salvation of) final release, become freed from attachment to the objects of the senses, and reach that condition of final deliverance from which there is no returning (to this world of *saṁsāra*).

Thus ends the eighth chapter, known as the system of Bhaṭṭācārya, in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.



CHAPTER IX.

THE SYSTEM OF THE SĀṆKHYAS.

1. Now the doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya* will be briefly described. The science of the *Sāṅkhyas* is of two kinds, namely, theistical and non-theistical.

2. Kapila produced the non-theistical (*Sāṅkhya*) and Patañjali (produced) the other. Kapila is (the incarnation of) Vāsudēva (Viṣṇu), and Patañjali is (the incarnation of) Ananta (the divine serpent).

3. Kapila teaches that the final liberation (of the soul) results through knowledge, while Patañjali teaches (that it results) from *yōga* (or practical application). A *yōgin* (however) stands in need of that knowledge of the ultimate principles which is given out in the system of Kapila.

4. In the *Vēdas*, the *Smṛtis*, the *Itihāsas*, the *Purāṇas*, the *Mahābhārata*, etc., and also in the scriptures of the *Saivas* and others, the teachings given in the *Sāṅkhya* (system) are clearly seen (to be adopted).

5. From the discrimination of the manifest and the unmanifest, the knowledge of the *puruṣa* (the individual soul) itself results; and through this (knowledge) there arises to men unfailingly the absolute cessation of the three miseries.

6-7. Misery is *ādhyātmika*, or *ādhibhautika*, or *ādhidaiivika*. The *ādhyātmika* (misery) consists of mental pain and of diseases such as boils, etc. The *ādhibhautika* misery is that which is caused by worms and other such living creatures. The *ādhidaiivika* misery is that which is caused by rain, sun, etc.

8. By means of the knowledge of the *ātman* (the individual soul), all the miseries unfailingly and absolutely cease to be. The freedom which results (to the soul) from other means (than this knowledge of the *ātman*) is subject to decadence and improvement.

9. Except by means of the knowledge of the ultimate principles, the final freedom (of the soul) cannot arise : (it cannot be produced) by any other means, such as medicinal and magical herbs, sacrifices, etc., which give rise to (the attainment of) *svarga* and other similar results, and (thus) fall within the scope of the three ' qualities ' (of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*).

10. To him alone, who knows the twenty-five principles consisting of the manifest, the unmanifest, etc., there comes the clear knowledge of the *ātman* (or self).

11. He who knows the twenty-five principles may live in whatever estate of life (he likes). Whether he (happens to) be a person characterised by matted hair or by shaven head or by locks of hair—(he) will obtain final freedom : there is no doubt about this.

12—14. The twenty-five principles are—the *puruṣa* (individual soul), the *prakṛti* (primordial nature-matter), the great principle of intellect, the principle of egoity ; similarly sound, touch, colour (or form), and taste, and smell ; the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue, the nose ; and again speech, hands, feet, the anus (as the organ of evacuation), the organ of reproduction, and similarly *manas* (the faculty of attention) ; earth and water, light, air, and ether (*ākāśa*) also.

I shall now explain the manner of creation. This world is made up of the principles (now mentioned).

15—16. Everything (in the world) is indeed a product of the *prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* is eternal, one, and non-intelligent. Although he (the *ātman*) is passively indifferent, yet, being influenced by the three qualities of the *prakṛti*, he appears as if he were an agent (in the act of creation). Through the association (of *prakṛti*) with that (*ātman*) possessed of consciousness, there arises creation. (This is) like the association of a lame person with a blind one (for mutual helpfulness). *Prakṛti* forms the equilibrium of the three qualities : the qualities are *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.

17. When *sattva* rises, then (will there be born) pleasure, love, tranquillity, modesty, lightness of body, patience and forgiveness,

courage, magnanimity, restraint of the senses, and the illumination of knowledge.

18. When the quality of *rajas* rises, then (there will be born) covetousness, anguish, anger, quarrel, egotism, lying, worldly activity, and boastfulness also.

19. When the quality of *tamas* rises, then (there will be born) drowsiness, stupidity, sleep, heaviness of body, laziness, ignorance, and carelessness, and so forth.

20. In connection with the system as thought out by Vyāsa in the *Mahābhārata*, I shall clearly describe well as they are, and at great length, (all) the details in respect of (these) three 'qualities'.

21. The *mahat* (or the great principle of intellect) is produced out of the *prakṛti*, and out of this (*mahat*) the principle of egoity (*ahankāra*). Out of this are produced the five (things) known as the rudimentary principles (*tanmātras*); they are indeed subtle elements.

22—24. From these are produced what are called speech, hands and feet, the anus (as the organ of evacuation), the organ of reproduction, and what are spoken of as sound, touch, and colour (or form), and taste and smell; and also ether (*ākāśa*), air, fire, water and earth—only as they are in the subtle condition but not otherwise.

Just as a cloth, which is produced out of white threads, is purely white, so also the creation of the principles of nature is of three kinds in accordance with the three 'qualities' (of *prakṛti*). The things having the nature of the quality of *sattva* have been created (first); and then out of them have been produced the (various) organs of sense.

25. These (organs) are five (in number), namely, the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose. By means of these, he (the *puruṣa*) perceives sound, touch, colour (or form), taste and smell (respectively).

26—27. (Then) there are those (things) which have been produced out of the quality of *rajas*; and out of them (have been derived) afterwards the organs of activity, consisting of what are known as (the organ of) speech, hands and feet, and the anus

(as the organ of evacuation), and also the organ of reproduction; and similarly (are) also (derived) the activities of speaking, seizing, going, evacuating the bowels, and enjoying pleasure. The *manas*, which is called the internal organ (of attention), has to be understood to be the eleventh organ.

28. Out of other things, derived, from the quality of *tamas*, the elements—namely, earth, water, light, and air and ether—have been born.

29. These are indeed the twenty-five principles that have been given out by me. These are the very (things) that have to be learnt in detail through the mouth of a preceptor.

30. The individual souls are at the time of universal dissolution absorbed into the *prakṛti*, (they) being (then) possessed of subtle bodies. Under the influence of the 'qualities' (of *prakṛti*) and their own *karmas* (or the impressed results of works), they (the individual souls) assume various (physical) forms (beginning with) that of (the four-faced) *Brahmā* and ending with that of inanimate objects.

31. In fact the whole of this world exists in a subtle form in the *prakṛti* (itself). It only becomes manifest (in creation). It is not desirable (to hold) that the production (of an entity) out of non-entity is (possible).

32. According to the view that (an entity) may be produced out of non-entity, things like the horns of a hare would also become possible (as entities). If the oil (produced out of *sesamum* seeds) does not already exist in the *sesamum*, then it must be possible to find it in sand and such other things also.

33. The fault pointed out by you, that, (in this system), a produced effect has also to become a producer, cannot prove to be (a fault at all) in relation to the view which maintains (creation to be a modified) manifestation (of what has been already in existence): because there are causes (here) which give rise to (such) manifestations (of modification).

34–35. Individual souls may be proved to exist in every one of the bodies (of all kinds of beings), and (they) are (thus) many in number. If (the soul of all beings) be (only) one, (then)

all (beings) would have to die at the same time or be born (at the same time); (or) when one man saw (anything), all would have to see (that same thing) at that same time. Hence the multiplicity of souls follows (as a logical consequence), and (the idea of) non-duality (in regard to the *ātman*) is inappropriate.

36. The teaching, given in the scriptural injunction—"The *ātman* has to be known, etc.,"—and in other similar injunctions, relates to such duties as tend to turn (men) away from (worldly) activity, and bestows (on them) the final freedom of the soul. The other (kind of prescribed duty) leads (men) to (worldly) activity.

37. Although the sacrifices, known as *Agnistoma*, etc., are enjoined in the scripture, yet they are all intended for the attainment of (certain) desired objects. These (ritual works) have (all) to be understood to constitute the duties that appertain to active (wordly) life, inasmuch as they impel (men to live) the life of (wordly) activity.

38. By means of (the righteousness of) duty, men rise aloft; by means of (the unrighteousness of) non-duty, they go down. The final release of the soul results exclusively from knowledge. It is through ignorance that man gets into the bondage (of *samsāra*).

39. If the sacrifices, which are performed as offerings unto the *Brahman*, give rise to the final emancipation of the soul, then it will follow that they are not sacrifices (at all), for the reason that the meaning of the *mantras* (to be used in them) is made (thus) into something other (than itself).

40. Accordingly, sacrifices and other such duties lead (men) to the life of *samsāra*. (Still) such things as give rise to the prosperity of men have (often) to be accomplished even with the aid of uncommended means.

Thus ends the ninth chapter, known as the *Sāṅkhya* system of *Kapila Vāsudeva*, in the *Sarva-darsana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable *Śaṅkarācārya*.

CHAPTER X.

THE SYSTEM OF PATAÑJALI.

1. I shall now explain the system of Patañjali, which is the theistic *Sāṅkhya*. Patañjali is (the incarnation of) Ananta (the divine serpent) and is the promulgator of the science of *yōga*.

2. One, who knows the twenty-five principles and the *Puruṣa* (or the Lord) beyond the *prakṛti*, acquires perfection in *yōga*; through *yōga* the destruction of evil is brought about.

3-4. The twenty-five principles, namely, the *puruṣa* (or individual soul) the *prakṛti*, the *mahat* (or the great principle of intellect), the principle of egoity, the sixteen (principles) consisting of the rudimentary elemental principles with (their) modifications, also the (five) great elements—these have all been well explained by the sage (Kapila) himself. The view that the final emancipation of the soul results from pure (and simple) knowledge is indicative of mere laziness.

5-10. Even in the case of one who has acquired knowledge, mental misapprehension certainly occurs occasionally through errors. Although a person has his ignorance destroyed by means of the knowledge imparted to him by his preceptor, still it is only by means of *yōga* that he can destroy that stain of evil which clings to the (otherwise clean) mirror of the body. The well-known sweet taste of jaggery, etc., is not, for example, (actually) experienced by those who suffer from bilious fever. Therefore one should destroy (these) tainting evils (which cling to the body). There is nothing other than *yōga*, which can accordingly destroy these evils appertaining to a man, who has acquired knowledge through the teachings of his preceptor, and has become free from attachment to (all) worldly objects of desire. (Men) do actions out of (selfish) desires, because of (the idea of their own) agency (in relation to those actions) which is due to ignorance. Then, in consequence of the ripening of

(their) *karma* (the impressed influence of works), there result (to them) birth, life, and enjoyment. The five afflictions are ignorance, and desire and aversion—both of which are born out of it—egoity, and anxious attachment. Ignorance is indeed the cause of all these (afflictions). Ignorance is the superimposition of the idea of the self on the body which is non-self.

11—13. The body is made up of the five (great) elements (of nature). But the owner of the body is the self that is different from it. In regard to sons, grandsons, and such other progeny, which are all the offspring of that (body), as also in regard to the enjoyable objects of the body, such as houses, lands, etc.,—the idea that they are all one's own is also ignorance. Therefore, after his ignorance is destroyed, and after he is freed from desire and aversion, which are due to that (ignorance), the person, who is not desirous of the fruits of works here (in this world) and there (in the other), should practise *yōga* with the object of attaining the final freedom of the soul. *Yōga* is that self-abidance (of the soul) which is consequent upon the suppression of the functioning of the thinking principle.

14. (These) functionings (of the thinking principle), which are differentiated into those which are associated with the 'afflictions', and those which are not (so) associated with the 'afflictions', will not be described here. One should go through that (kind of) practical application to work (in life) which directly leads on (men) to (the practice of) *yōga*.

15. This (sort of) practical application consists in *tapas* (penance), in the silent repetition of *mantras* (prayer-formulas), and in firm love and devotion to the Lord God. The Lord God is He, who is free from the 'afflictions' and from the influence of the fructification of *karma* (operating as merit or demerit) and from other such things, and is (also) omniscient (at the same time).

16. Because He is not limited by time, (He) is considered to be superior to *Brahmā* and the other (gods). *Pranava* (the mystic syllable *Ōm*) is denotative of Him; and the silent repetition thereof (gives rise to) the mental comprehension of what is denoted by it.

17—19. The destruction of the obstacles to (the practice of) *yōga* takes place (in this manner), and thereby the mind becomes turned inwards (towards itself). Laziness, severe ailments, carelessness, langour, doubt, unsteadiness of mind, want of faith, deluded perception, pain, cheerlessness of mind, ardent attachment to the objects of the senses, defects appertaining to breathing in and to breathing out, unrestrainable shivering of the body—these and other similar evils form naturally the obstacles to *yōga*.

20. One should accordingly destroy the obstacles (to *yōga*) by means of the earnest worship of the Lord. The purification of the mind, as a means for attaining success in *yōga*, has to be accomplished through (the continued exercise of) friendliness and other such (suitable feelings).

21. (The feeling of) friendliness should be exercised in relation to men of wisdom, and (that of) pity in relation to persons in distress. Pleased satisfaction should be shown in relation to righteousness, and indifference in relation to those that are sinful.

22—23. Devotional service in holy places of pilgrimage, association with good people, repeated endeavour to live the life of the Lord, (the effort to arrive at) the mental comprehension of the inner soul—by means of these and other similar endeavours the mind of the *yōgin* (becomes) well purified, and is (then) enabled to conceive (correctly) the things which are very minute as also the things which are (very) big.

24—25. When that which is harmful is removed from what constitutes the instrument (for the practice) of the (various) constituent parts of *yōga*, (then there arises) the illumination of knowledge. The constituents of *yōga* are eight in number, viz., internal self-control, external regulation, bodily postures, control of the breath, withdrawal of the senses from outside objects, fixity of attention, meditative concentration, and attentive self-realisation. They are (described) in detail thus:—

26. Abstaining from (inflicting) injury, truthfulness, abstention from stealing, celibacy, and freedom from acquisitive covetousness—these are the five elements of internal self-control, which are known to be in accordance with (one's) birth, etc.

27. The elements of external regulation are cleanliness, glad-some contentment, austerity, (repetition of) religious hymns (or mystical formulas), and the worship of the Lord. Now, I shall describe the results of internal self-control and of external regulation when they are successfully carried out.

28. The result of abstaining from (all) injury is the abandonment of enmity near where he (who abstains from injury) happens to be. From truthfulness arises the non-vanity of language, and from abstention from stealing comes the acquisition of (all) gems (of value).

29. From celibacy comes the acquisition of energy, and from the freedom from acquisitive covetousness there arises the knowledge of (past) births. Cleanliness gives rise to the absence of disgust in connection with one's own body, as also to the avoidance of contact with wicked people.

30. The results of mental purity are the purification of (the whole) constitution, good-minded-ness, singleness of purpose, subjugation of the senses, and fitness for self-realisation.

31. The *yōgin* obtains unsurpassable joy as the result of his gladsome contentment. The result of (the practice of) austerity is to endow the senses and the body with superior powers.

32. Through the endowment of the senses with superior powers, there arises the ability to see objects at a distance, etc. By means of the endowment of the body with superior powers, he, who has (thus come to possess) a divinely gifted body, acquires the (supra-normal) power of becoming as small as an atom and other such (powers).

33. Through the silent repetition of religious hymns (or mystical prayer-formulas), there results the attraction of the gods (towards the aspirant); and through the worship of the Lord, there arises *samādhi* (or self-realisation). That which is firm and agreeable is the (proper) posture (in all cases); thereby the destruction of the pairs of opposites (such as heat and cold, pain and pleasure, desire and aversion) takes place.

34. The *yōgins* have to adopt in sitting the postures called *padma*, *bhadra*, and *mayūra*, as also the *vīra*, *svastika*, and *kukkūṭa* postures—which are all described in (works bearing on) the science of *yōga*.

35. The control of the breath consists in a regulated restraint (exercised) in relation to inspiration and expiration ; it is in fact to be practised by the (aspiring) *yōgin* in the three ways known as *rēcaka*, *pūraka*, and *kumbhaka*.

36. *Rēcaka* results from expelling the air that is within ; *pūraka* results from filling in (the lungs) with air ; but the *kumbhaka* is (the condition) characterised by motionlessness (of air) owing to (it) being (then) as if in a well-filled pot.

37. There is a fourth (kind of) breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*), in which the air is in its own (natural) condition, being dissociated from the *rēcaka*, *pūraka* and *kumbhaka* (processes) ; this (state of the natural self-abidance of the breath) destroys the sins arising out of (one's) nescience.

38. The process of sense-withdrawal consists in drawing away the wandering senses from their objects ; and the result of this (process) is the subjugation of the senses.

39. Fixing the attention is the (process of) fixing the mind on some (object well defined in) space ; and it is in fact of two kinds, in consequence of (this defined) space being internal or external. The external (object defined in) space consists of images and such other things.

40. The internal (object defined in) space consists of the circle of the navel, the heart, and so on. The fixing of the mind thereon is merely (directing) its existence (to be) there ; (it is) nothing else.

41. Meditative concentration (*dhyāna*) is a continued oneness of the idea (or conception in the mind) in relation to the circle of the navel or other such (objects in definite internal) positions. Self-realisation (*samādhi*), however, consists in the endurance of the soul in relation to those same (positions) in the manner of a thing that is emptied of all its contents.

42. In relation to the three (constituents of *yōga*), beginning with the fixing of attention (*dhāraṇa*) and looked upon as forming one topic (of description), there is, for the purpose of easily mentioning (all) three of them (at once), the technical name of *saṁyama*.

43. By success in (the practice of) *śamīyama*, the expansion of the vision of wisdom takes place in the case of the *yōgin*. This *śamīyama* has indeed to be practised, and its practical utilisation has to be in (accordance with) the following steps.

44. The three (constituents of *yōga*), beginning with the fixing of attention (*dhāraṇa*), are indeed more essential (to the practice of *yōga*) than the (remaining) five, beginning with internal self-control (*yama*). That *śamādhi* (self-realisation), which is absolute and indefinable, is higher than these three.

45-46. Without winning success in (the practice of what happens to be) the lower step, one should not ascend to the higher (step). In ascending to the (higher) step without winning mastery (over the lower one), the *yōgin* will be prone to (suffer from) ailments, such as hiccough, hard breathing, catarrh, pain in the ears and teeth and eyes, dumbness, dullness, cough, head-ache and fever.

47. In relation to the person to whom (success in) *yōga* comes through the grace of the Lord, these ailments born of the lower and the higher steps do not at all occur.

48. The whole (body) of (one's) attributes (*dharma*) is only one (as an integral whole): by undergoing modifications in the form of childhood, boyhood, youth, and old age, that (one and the same body of attributes), however, perishes in time (at last).

49. In the case of a person, who has directed his mind outwards, time passes away by day and by night through the *idā* and the *piṅgalā*. He, who has directed his mind inwards, has to effect the cessation of that (flow of time) with the help of the *suṣumnā*.

50. The *suṣumnā* is the path of liberation; time is indeed deceived therein. Time consists of (what is determined with the aid of) the moon and the sun; their two paths are well known.

51. The clarified butter which is got out of milk cannot again assume the condition of milk. (Similarly), the *ātman* (or the soul) that has been separated from the 'qualities' cannot again become the possessor of 'qualities'.

52. Just as the metallic ores, that have been turned into gold by the philosopher's stone, cannot return to their former condition, so also the *ātman* (or soul) of the *yōgins* (cannot return to its previous captive condition).

53. Those who practise *yōga* should always know the manner of arrangement of the system of blood-vessel-tubes. The *susumnā* goes into the head through an opening in the central back-bone.

54. The *idā* and the *piṅgalā* are on the left and right of the region of the nose; the *idā* is the path of the moon, and similarly the *piṅgalā* is the path of the sun.

55. The *kuḥū* is below, and goes to the genital organ and the testes and also to the anus; the *viśvōdarā* and the *dhāranā* (go) respectively to the left and to the other (*i.e.*, the right) hands.

56. The *hastī-jihvā* and the *yaśasvinī* are known to be (of) the left and of the other (*i.e.*, the right) feet; the *sarasvatī* is (of) the tongue and starts from behind the *susumnā*.

57. The *śaṅkhinī* and the *payasvinī* are on the two sides of it, and are (of) the two ears; the *gāndhārī* is (of) the left eye, and the *pūṣan* is (of) the right eye.

58. The blood-vessel-tubes proceeding from the neck are (those of) the organs of sense and activity. The *yōgins* have to understand (these) *nāḍīs* to be (merely) tubular vessels and nothing else.

59. The movement of the principal vital air and of its other varieties, which takes place only in (these) tubular vessels, should be made out exactly as it is. The functions of those (various kinds of vital air) have to be learnt from (works on) the science of *yōga*.

60. The *yōgin* becomes the knower of all things by practising *saṁnyama* in relation to suitably defined objects of *saṁnyama*. By practising *saṁnyama* in relation to the innate impressions (stored up in the mind), there arises the knowledge of former births.

61. By practising *saṁnyama* in relation to elephants and other such (objects) as defined in space, the strength of elephants and other like (animals) will result. The *yōgin* obtains (the feeling of) friendliness, &c., by practising *saṁnyama* in relation to friendliness and other such (objects of meditation).

62. He will obtain the knowledge of (all) the constellations of stars by practising *saṁyama* in relation to the moon. By practising *saṁyama* in relation to the pole-star, the knowledge of the future is the result; and from the *saṁyama* relating to the sun, there results the knowledge of (all) the worlds.

63. From the *saṁyama* relating to the circle of the navel, there arises the knowledge of the arrangements of the various parts in the construction of the body. And from the *saṁyama* relating to the cavity of the ear, the cessation of hunger and thirst results.

64. Steadiness results from (the *saṁyama* relating to) the *nāḍī* of the ear, and the knowledge of perfected beings (results) from (the *saṁyama* relating to) material light. From (the *saṁyama* relating to) the tip of the tongue, the consciousness of taste results; and (from that relating to) the tip of the nose the feeling of smell (results).

65—67. By the constant practice (of *yōga*), the colour of the (*yōgin's*) body comes to be of a beautiful complexion. In the course of a year the cessation of hunger and thirst is also brought about, in as much as the various powers and perfections due to *yōga* are produced (generally) in one year—such (powers and perfections) as moving about as one desires, the knowledge relating to things long past, &c., the purification of one's own body and senses, and the weakening (of the grip) of old age and death. Soon after, with the aid of renunciation, freedom from the recurrence of re-births (*saṁsāra*) results to the *yōgin*.

68. To the person, who has accomplished success in (the practice of) *yōga*, come the eight (extraordinary powers), beginning with (the power of) becoming as minute as an atom. As in the case of Śiva, so indeed (in his case) there can be, in consequence of this (acquisition of powers), no obstruction to the final freedom of the soul.

69. And among them (we have) the power of becoming extremely minute (*anūnā*), the power of becoming extremely light (*laghimā*), and similarly the power of becoming extremely great (*mahimā*), the power of reaching things anywhere and from anywhere (*prāpti*), (the weightiness of) rulership (*śatā*), irresistible

will (*prākāmya*), and similarly masterfulness (*iśitva*), and that power of subduing all things (*vaśitva*) which yields (to one all that one may) desire.

Thus ends the tenth chapter, known as the system of Patañjali, the theistic *Sāṅkhya*, in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.



CHAPTER XI.

THE SYSTEM OF VĒDAVYĀSA.

1. Now, the essence of the *Vēdas*, which has been given out by Vyāsa in the *Mahā-bhārata* so as to be in agreement with all the *Sāstras*, is in fact derived from the system of the *Sāṅkhyas* by the believers in the *Vēdas*.

2. This world is made up of two things, namely, the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. The higher (of these two), abiding in the 'city' made up of the rudimentary elemental principles, is held to be the *puruṣa*.

3. (These) rudimentary principles are (indeed) the elements in their subtle condition, and they are mostly held to be characterised by the three 'qualities' (of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*). The *prakṛti* (denotes) the (condition of) equalisation of (these) 'qualities'; and the qualities are *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.

4. A man's bondage (in matter) is (his) happening to be swayed by the 'qualities', and his emancipation (from that bondage) is to know how to discriminate between (these) 'qualities'. According to the nature of the 'qualities' (which sway it), an *īman* (or soul) is of the best, or of the middling, or of the worst kind.

5-6. The best (*ātman*) is (that of) one who is endowed with the quality of *sattva*, and has a phlegmatic temperament and is of the nature of (the element of) water. The middling (variety of) *ātman* is in fact he who is endowed with the quality of *rajas*; and he is known to be of a bilious temperament. The worst (*ātman*), who is endowed with the quality of *tamas*, is of a rheumatic (or windy) temperament, for *tamas* is wind (looked upon as a humour of the body). The quality of *sattva* is (conceived to be) white (in colour), the quality of *rajas* (to be) red, and the quality of *tamas* (to be) grey (or) black.

7. Therefore the persons endowed with the quality of *sattva*, and the others (endowed with the other qualities), have (respectively) the nature of water, fire, and wind, and are white, red, and black (in colour). (They are) distinguished by means of their respective appearances, activities, &c.

8. (The person characterised by the quality of *sattva*) has the colour of the *priyangu* or of the *dūrva* grass or of (shining) weapons of war or of lotuses or of gold, and is phlegmatic in temperament; the joints of his bones are invisible; he has a compact and broad chest; his body is big (and well grown).

9. He is deep (and dignified), muscular and handsome, and has the (steady) gait of the elephant; he is noble-minded, and his voice is like (the sound of) the tabor; he is intelligent, merciful, truthful in speech, and straightforward.

10. He is not (apt to be) troubled by the annoyances of petty griefs, and he is similarly (not troubled) by heat; he is abundantly blessed with many sons and servants, is possessed of great vital potency, and is capable of enjoying delightful pleasures.

11. He has a virtuous disposition, and is moderate in speech; in no case does he speak harshly; even in boyhood, he happens to be free from crying (in consequence of disappointment), and is unaffected by unsteady wishfulness; he is never very much tormented by hunger.

12. He eats (generally) a small quantity of sweet and gently warm food, and yet he is strong; he inwardly puts up with enmities for long without retaliation.

13. Courage, intelligence, memory, love, happiness, modesty, agility of body, freedom from indebtedness, equanimity in behaviour, healthfulness, absence of meanness, steadiness of purpose:

14. Not (being prone) to indulge in boastful talk about pious deeds done in response to religion and charity, bestowing favours by the giving of gifts, and freedom from covetousness in relation to the wealth of others:

15. And mercy for all beings—it is by means of these attributes that he who is characterised by *sattva* has to be diagnosed here (in this world). The man who is characterised by *rajas* has to be distinguished here similarly by the attributes that appertain to *rajas*.

16. *Rajas* is bile and that is fire itself; or perhaps (this) fire is the product of that bile. The (*rājasa*) man of bilious temperament is characterised by unbearable thirst and is (much) troubled by hunger. He is given to unlimited eating.

17. The hair (on his head) is brown, and he has few hairs (on the body); his face and feet and hands are ruddy; he cannot bear heat—and has a warm body; he perspires freely, and is possessed of an offensive smell.

18. He becomes healthy through the clearing of the bowels, and thus the possessor of a soft abdomen; he is apt to become very angry, and proves to be a hero of excellent bearing and of (high) self-respect; he is in dread of distress, and is endowed with (great) learning.

19. He is fond of flower-garlands and fragrant unguents, etc., and has a very happy and bright appearance; he has (comparatively) small vital potency, and his carnal desires are very limited; he is not a loved favourite with women.

20. Even in boyhood, he puts on grey hairs; (or) having red hairs, he becomes subject to the eye affection (called) *nālikā*: he is physically strong, enterprising, given to enjoyments, and is always in possession of wealth and greatness.

21. He always eats such food as is sweet and fresh; he has no liking for what is pungent and sour; he takes food which is not very hot, drinking much water while (doing so).

22. His eyes have very thin and scanty eye-lashes, and he is apt to be fond of cold water; through anger and through the heat of the sun, he becomes quickly reddened in colour.

23-24. Illiberality, unmercifulness, enjoyments based upon pleasure and pain, dis-regard of others out of personal pride, anxiety, cherishing enmity, taking away another's wife, shamelessness, and hypocrisy—these are said to be the attributes of him who is characterised by *rajas*. And the attributes of the person characterised by *tamas* are as follow:—

25. It must be understood that unrighteousness is the outcome of *tamas*, and the person characterised by *tamas* is dominated by (the humour of) wind. He is wretched, envious; he is a thief, is unrefined, and firmly atheistic.

26. The ends of his hairs are split to a great length ; he is lean, black and very hairy ; his teeth are rough, incompactly set, and thick ; and his body is grey with dust.

27. His courage, intellect, activity, eye-sight, movement and memory are (all) unsteady ; his friendship is unenduring, and his talk is always incoherent.

28. He is a gormand, is addicted to hunting, and is full of dirt and fond of quarrels ; he is incapable of bearing cold, is fickle-minded and fault-finding, and has a rough (broken) voice.

29. His changeful talk (ever) relates to what is near at hand, and he is always given to take delight in music and musical instruments ; he enjoys sweets and other such things, and is (also) fond of well-cooked and sour eatables.

30. He is seen to be possessed of very little bile and phlegm ; he sleeps much and lives with the aid of scanty livelihood. By means of these and other similar characteristics, the *tāmasa* person, who is (as such) affected with wind (as a humour of the body), has to be diagnosed.

31—37. I shall now describe the characteristics of the five elements, which (characteristics) do not differ very much from the three qualities (of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamus*).

In the body of all moveable beings, (there are) five kinds of constituent materials, which are different from one another : and it is by means of them that the body puts forth (its) activities. The skin, the flesh and the bones, the marrow and the tendon as the fifth—these (materials) in the body are considered to be made up of (the element of) earth. Power and similarly anger, and the eyes and also heat are derived out of (the element of) fire ; and (this) fire also causes (the things eaten) to be digested. (These are) the five igneous products which belong to embodied beings. The ear and the nose and the mouth, the heart and the abdomen as well—these five constituent parts in the body of living beings are the outcome of the element of ether (*ākāśa*). Phlegm, bile and sweat, fat and blood as well—thus is (the element of) water found always in five forms in the body of living beings. Through the inspiratory vital air, the embodied being is made to live ; through the circulatory vital air, he always grows in size

and develops; the excretory vital air goes downwards, and the digestive vital air exists in the centre (of the abdomen); through the upward expiratory vital air, he (the embodied being) breathes out and gives utterance to the various kinds of significant words.

38-39. Thus these five (different kinds of) vital air cause (all) embodied beings to manifest their activities here.

The detailed varieties (of the quality) of smell, which characterises the (element of) earth, have to be understood as consisting of the following nine kinds, (namely), the agreeable-like, the disagreeable-like, the sweet, similarly the pungent, the diffusive, the inherent, the delicate, the powerful, and the distinct.

40. The (quality of) taste, which is characteristic of (the element of) water is of the following six kinds in detail, namely, the sweet, the saltish, the bitter, the astringent, the sour and the pungent.

41-44. The qualities (derived) from (the element of) fire are also considered to consist of the following twelve (varieties) in detail, (namely), the short, the long and the stout, the square and the rotund, the white, the black, and similarly the red, the blue, the yellow and the tawny.

The following seven notes (of the gamut) are the qualities obtained out of sound: (and they are)—the *śadja*, the *ṛṣabha* and the *gāndhāra*, the *madhyama*, and similarly the *pañcama*, the *dhaivata*, and also the *nisāḍha*.

The qualities produced out of (the element of) air are the following twelve in detail: (and they are)—the hot, the cold, the pleasurable, the painful, the smooth, and also the clean, the hard, the sticky, the fine, the thick, the soft and the rough.

45-46. Along with these qualities that are (derived out of the element) of air, they mention that sound is derived out (of the element) of ether (*ākāśa*).

With the aid of those (above-mentioned) five constituent materials (of the body), one lives (well) in possession of consciousness, if they are not disorganised; if they become disorganised, one loses consciousness; (and it is through them that) one always attains growth and development. In (all) embodied beings, (the elements of) water, fire and air are ever (active and) wakeful.

47-48. Viṣṇu, who has four forms of manifestation, created the world in four ways, and (created) also the classes, namely, the Brahmin, the Kṣātriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra, which have (all) their (respective) natures (determined) by qualities.

The Brahmin is white, the Kṣātriya is red, the Vaiśya is yellow, and the Śūdra black. It is in fact in the *Dharma-śāstra* that their (respective) vocations are described in detail.

49. The sage (Vyāsa), with the object of establishing the title (of all persons) to that (life of) righteous duty, which leads to the final deliverance of the soul from bondage, declared that in every class (of persons) in itself there are (to be found) all the four classes (of them) as determined by qualities.

50. Knowing the manner in which the *karma* of these (various kinds of persons) comes to bear fruit, he (Vyāsa) has ordained them to follow (according to their personal fitness) the scriptural sections dealing respectively with works, with the worship of the divinity and with (divine) wisdom.

51. Among those who are Brahmins (by birth), those (alone) are Brahmins (in reality), who are straightforward and possess the lustre of pure (white) colour, who possess (also) forgiveness and are kindly in disposition, and are devoted to their own (appropriate) duties (in life).

52. Those Brahmins (by birth) have come to assume the condition of Kṣātriyas—(those) who are fond of enjoying objects of desire, and are harsh and angry and are given to daring deeds, and have (thus) abandoned their own (appropriate) duties, and are possessed of bodies that are red in colour.

53. Those Brahmins (by birth) have become Vaiśyas---(those) who live by tending cattle, who are yellow-coloured, and earn their livelihood by means of agriculture, and (hence) do not do their own (appropriate Brahminical) duties.

54. Those Brahmins (by birth) have become Śūdras--(those) who are fond of injuring others and of speaking falsehood, who are mean, and do all kinds of work for the sake of (their) livelihood, and are black in colour, and have fallen away from purity.

55. Viṣṇu, who causes bewilderment to the gods, *daityas*, and *rākṣasas*, by means of the distinctions relating to (various) conventional and common duties, is Himself the bestower of final beatitude on all of them.

56. This is the boon given by Viṣṇu to Puṇḍarīka, namely, that final liberation would come to him in the course of four re-births, for the reason that he was devoted (to Him) in hatred.

57. In consequence of their own works, which follow the courses of (the qualities of) *rajas*, *sattva* and *tamas*, (the various beings) happen to be of the nature of those (qualities) : and (it is) the one only Viṣṇu (who) is attained by the gods, by the *daityas* and by the *rākṣasas* (equally).

58-59. Through the influence of the qualities of *rajas*, *sattva* and *tamas*, the one Viṣṇu Himself, under the names of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, performs (in relation to the world) the (threefold) work of creation, sustentation and destruction. By means of their conduct, nature, shape and colour, all the gods are made out to be endowed with (the quality of) *sattva*, (all) the *daityas* to be endowed with (the quality of) *rajas*, and (all) the *rākṣasas* to be endowed with (the quality of) *tamas*.

60. Virtue is (representative) of the leaning of the gods, and vice of that of the *asuras* and *rākṣasas*. Vice is (also representative of the leaning) of the *piśācas* and other such beings : their distinguishing qualities are *rajas* and *tamas*.

61. One should wish to obtain knowledge from Śiva ; one should wish to obtain prosperity from Agni (the god of fire) : one should wish to obtain health from the sun-god ; and one should wish to obtain (*mōkṣa*) the final liberation of the soul from Viṣṇu.

62. In whatsoever category (of beings) a being, who knows (his) duty, is born here—whether he be (born as) a god or an *asura*—he has to adopt his own duty (in life), although it (happens to) be what may not be duty (otherwise).

63. The duties, which are enjoined in the three *Vēdas*, have to be adopted by those who are endowed with the quality of *sattva*. What is (ordinarily) no (such) duty and is given out in the *Atharvavēda*—(that) is resorted to by those who are endowed with


(the quality of) *rajas* as well as by those who are endowed with (the quality of) *tamas*.

64. Just as (all our) sacrifices culminate to us in the attainment of Viṣṇu, so also those who are endowed with (the quality of) *rajas*, and those who are endowed with (the quality of) *tamas*, have to worship through (suitable) sacrifices Brahmā and Śiva, who are (respectively) characterised by those qualities.

65. Viṣṇu bestows blessings on those who come (to Him) along their own (prescribed) path of duty. One is released (from the bondage of *saṃsāra*) by means of one's own duties. The duty prescribed for another, (if adopted by those for whom it is not prescribed), brings on fear (to such persons).

66. Viṣṇu, who is supreme and one only, ever bestows blessings, out of (His own) sweet pleasure, on the *gods*, the *asuras*, and the *rākṣasas*, in ways which are accordant with the three qualities (of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*).

Thus ends the eleventh chapter, known as the system of the *Mahābhārata* as enunciated by Vēdayāsa, in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.



CHAPTER XII.

THE VĒDĀNTA SYSTEM.

1. Now the established conclusion of the *Vēdāntic* scriptures will be briefly given out (here). The conclusions of (all) other philosophic disputants mostly tend to (prove the truth of) that conclusion.

2. The *Brahman*, who forms the import of (*Upaniṣadic*) passages, such as —“That thou art,” has to be enquired into by those wise persons, who, through the good results of (their) works offered up unto the *Brahman*, have become qualified for (attaining) the knowledge of the *Brahman*.

3. He (alone) has the (required) qualifications (for the conduct of this enquiry), who possesses the power to discriminate the eternal from the non-eternal, and is free from the desire to (enjoy) the fruits (of works) here (in this world) as well as there (in the other world), and is also characterised by (internal mental) tranquillity, the restraint of the senses, and the desire to obtain the final emancipation (of the soul).
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4. “That certainly art thou: thou art none other.” The meaning of the word *That* (here) is the Supreme Lord: the meaning of the word *thou* is (any) other (being) that may be (pointed to) before (us)—a beast, or a man, or any other (being).

5. The meaning of the word *art* (here) has to be understood to be the (predication) of identity between the meaning of the word *That* and the meaning of the word *thou*. (This is) considered to be similar to the (predication) of identity (expressed) in such sentences as—“This is that man.”

6. Let (this your) opinion be (granted to be true). (But then), seeing that the sentence—“That thou art”, and other such (sentences) give rise (only) to the knowledge of such things, as are (of themselves already) well made out (without any reference to

any association with any action), how can such (sentences) prompt men to (live) the active life? It is only a mandatory injunction that induces activity.

7. Those sacrificers, who are purported to be referred to by means of injunctive passages, such as—"The self has to be known", etc., (they) are (merely) eulogised in the *Ārunas*, which are discussions bearing upon reality.

8. The self (*ātman*) is different from the intellect, the senses and the body; it is all-pervading and unchangeable, and appears to be manifold in (our) perceptions of things (by reason of its manifesting itself separately) in every (separate) ground of (its) habitation, (that is, in every perceivable object).

9. Consequently the enquiry into the *Brahman* is fruitless, inasmuch as the sentence ("That thou art", or any other like it in the *Ārunas*) means what is other (than a commandment). To this (objection) we give the justificatory reply that the verbal form of the potential mood (*liñ*) is not (in speech) the only means which gives rise to activity.

10. People are led into activity, also by knowing (a thing) to possess the characteristics of a means (suited) to accomplish desired ends. In sentences like—"A son has been born to you", the form of the injunction (giving rise to gladsome action on the part of the hearing father) is not of that (potential *liñ*) kind.

11. The injunctions, such as 'The self has to be known', etc., which are (all) found in the *Ārunas*, enjoin (as duty the acquisition of) the knowledge relating to the *Brahman* on (all) those whose minds have been deluded by nescience.

12-13. It may be so. (But it may be said that) a person, who, after giving up such works as have (selfish) objects of desire in view, and also such (other works) as are prohibited in the scriptures, performs the works which are enjoined in the scriptures, has the internal organ (of the soul) purified, and (thereby) becomes of himself the knower (of the *Brahman*), without requiring any language (of instruction) from a spiritual preceptor. This (view) is not right. (The true) knowledge (of philosophic reality) cannot be obtained by means of mere works.

14—16. Indeed that is declared in the *Ārunas* to be (true) knowledge, which is born (in the pupil) through the kindly favour of the spiritual teacher (bestowed in the way of appropriate instruction). Works give by means of (their own) power an in-bent leaning to the mind : and (then) having (thus) fulfilled (their) purpose, they disappear like clouds at the end of the rainy season. In the case of him, however, whose mind is bent inwards, and who is (thus) qualified to receive the knowledge of the *Brahman*, the enquiry into (the nature of) the *Brahman* is certainly induced by means of—“That thou art”—and other such (sentences in the teaching) of the spiritual preceptor. The collection of sentences, consisting of—“That thou art”—and other such (sentences), has indeed been commented upon (by various teachers) over and over again.

17. The self (*ātman*) does not manifest itself to him who is destitute of the kindly favour of the spiritual preceptor. The universe, which is made up of the five elements, is produced out of the cause consisting of nescience (*avidyā*) as appertaining to the self (*ātman*).

18. The whole world has to be realized as forming an illusory manifestation of the *Brahman* (constituting its basis), so that (in consequence) the unreality consisting of the body and the (outer) world goes away (at once and altogether from the vision of the truth-perceiving soul).

19. The nescience in respect of the self (*ātman*) is that view (of things) which is contrary to the true knowledge of the (nature of the) self as declared in the *Vēdānta* ; and that (nescience) is beginningless and exists in a gross as well as in a subtle form.

20. From the *ātman* (self) came forth the element of ether (*ākāśa*) ; from this the air (came forth) ; from the air the fire (came forth) ; from this (fire) water (came forth) ; from water the earth came into existence ; and from the earth arose the paddy plant and other such plants.

21—27. From plants (came forth) food ; from food came forth man with (his) five soul-sheaths. The creature, who is made

up of the subtle elements, and in whom the rudimentary elemental principles have not been separated through analysis, becomes grossified (in the course of creation); and beasts, men and gods constitute (only) varieties of such (created beings). On the preponderance of virtue (in one's *kurma*), the condition of god (arises in relation to one): through unrighteousness (in one's *karma*), the condition of beast (is brought about): on these two things (virtue and unrighteousness) being equal (in one's *karma*), the condition of man (is produced). Thus indeed are (the creatures) of three kinds, in accordance with (their) *karmas*. The skin, the blood, the flesh, the fat, the bone, the marrow of bone, and the semen—these seven constituents of the body are (all) modifications of food. Masculinity and femininity also are not self-evolved. A male is invariably born, when there is a preponderance of the (power of the) semen in the womb (of the mother); a female (is born) when similarly there is a preponderance of (the power of) the uterine blood; and the (neither-male-nor-female) eunuch (is born), when there is an equality of those two things. The marrow of bone, the bone and the sinew (in the child) are produced out of the semen (of the male parent); the skin, the flesh and the blood (in the child) are produced out of the uterine blood (of the female parent). These are called the six vestures (of the body), of which (the first) three are due to the father, and (the other) three to the mother.

Hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death, these are the six waves (of infirmity) to be found as two and two—in life, in the mind, and in the body (respectively). (Many) philosophic controversialists mistakenly entertain the notion of the soul here in relation to the five sheaths (of the soul).

28. The *annamaya-kōśa*, the *prāṇamaya-kōśa*, the *manōmaya-kōśa*, the *vijñānamaya-kōśa*, and similarly the *ānandamaya-kōśa* are (together) declared to be the five sheaths of the soul.

29. Since the affix *mayat* is (here) used in the sense of modification, (we have) the *ānandamaya* repeated (again and again in the context in the scripture concerned). The *Lōkāyala* indeed accepts the body, which is (merely) that (kind of) self which is *annamaya* (or what is made up of food).

30. The *Ārhatas* understand (the self) to be the body-bounded *prāṇamaya* (or that which consists of life). The *Bauddhas* accept the self which is *viññānamaya* (or what consists of consciousness); but (they accept) nothing beyond.

31. Some believers in the *Vēdas* speak of the self as the *ānandamaya* (or what consists of bliss). He, however, who declares that the material principle of egoity is the self, generally says that it is the *manōmaya* (or what consists of the *manas*).

32—36. According to the view of those, who (truly) know the self, the self has to be understood to be untouched by the quality of being the agent and by (all) other (such qualities). The agentship of the self has to be inevitably accepted by those who take their stand on that section of the scriptures which deals with ritualistic works (*karmakāṇḍa*), as well as by those who rely upon that section which deals with deities (*dēvatākāṇḍa*): for, otherwise, no (ritual) work can be carried out successfully (by them).

In relation to the injunction—“The Brahmin should kindle the (sacrificial) fires here in the spring (season)” —who is it that is entitled to (perform) the (enjoined) work, is it the (Brahmin’s) body (in itself), or (is it the body) as in association with the soul? Seeing that, as the body is non-intelligent, it is impossible for it to have the desire for the attainment of *svarga* (the celestial world of enjoyments), and seeing also that (the body) is subject to be destroyed, it is not possible for it to be the agent in relation to this (kind of) work. The soul does not at all possess the characteristics of Brahmin-hood and of other such class-distinctions. That (viz., the soul) is (really) apart from class-divisions, caste, estates of life, conditions of age, and (all other such distinguishing) differences. There is (moreover) nothing other than (both) the body and the soul, which is (specially) qualified (to be the agent in relation to such ritualistic works).

37—38. Therefore the agent in relation to this (kind of) action has to be understood to be (some) hypothetical being (of some kind). That which shines forth, after (all) the five sheaths of the soul are one after another declared to be “no—no”, that is the supreme *Brahman*. What is other than that has to be nescience

(*avidyā*). That (nescience) covers up (and conceals) the true nature of the self, and (thereby) gives rise to an abundance of (its) illusory projections.

39-40. The illusory projection known as egoity is always productive of (the bondage of) *karma* through desire. (It) is the root of all (our cosmic) illusion, and carries (with itself) the association of misery : and in relation to all (persons), it distinctly gives rise (further) to all those worldly and *Vādic* expressions of (common) experience, wherein there are differentiations of the knower, the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, etc., as though (all these illusory differentiations were) true.

41. Surely in relation to the self, which is actionless and association-less, and is (moreover) the independent and undesiring consciousness itself, this (manner of the) expression of experience cannot (indeed) take place of itself.

42. It is certain that the non-intelligent egoity, which has consciousness (merely) super-imposed upon it, behaves (in consequence) as if it were (itself) conscious (and intelligent). Through the super-imposition of something else, which is other (than itself), the self shines forth as though it were (really) other (than itself).

43. That thing, (namely, our body) which is pointed to by the word *this*, consists of two parts. Of these the *prāṇa* (or life) is the basis of (our) activities ; the other thing which is spoken of as intellect and *manas* is the basis of knowledge.

44. Physical movements and other such things, the five vital airs beginning with the *prāṇa* (which is the principal vital air), and the instrumental organs (of sense and activity), etc., which form (as it were) the door-way to various kinds of activity such as speaking, etc.,—all these may be accepted (as attributes) in relation to that (body).

45—47. In consequence of (the variation in) function, the internal organ here is of two kinds (consisting of) the intellect (*buddhi*) and *manas* (the faculty of attention). If it be held that it is the pure and simple *ātman* (or self) which directly shines out in the idea of I-ness (or egoity), then tell me whether, in the idea —‘ I am lean,’ (that self is apprehended as) pure and simple

or not. Just as 'lean' and other such (attributes) are not, owing to their perceivability, considered to be the attributes of the *ātman* (self), so also indeed pleasure and such other things, which are (all) found (to exist altogether) in the body, cannot be the attributes of the *ātman*. According to the view of those who (truly) know the *ātman*, the *ātman* is (entirely) distinct from the knower, the means of knowledge, and the object of knowledge.

48. After discarding (all) those philosophical controversialists who declare otherwise, (the *ātman*) has to be explained (to all) in this very manner. (But) to no one should it be taught that the not-self is (that which forms) the object of perception.

49—50. Because no one (ever) has the cognition—'I am a pot'; because (the body) is possessed of form (or colour) and such other (qualities); because (it) is perceivable, non-intelligent and made up of the (material) elements; because also (it) is fit to be eaten as food by dogs and other such (animals); and because (again) consciousness shines forth (always) in contradistinction from the body—the body is not the self (*ātman*).

51. Therefore the body which is (merely) *annamaya* (or made up of food) cannot be the *ātman* as the *Lokāyatās* declare. The *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) also cannot be the *ātman*, because it is aerial and non-intelligent like the external air (of the atmosphere).

52. The senses also cannot be the *ātman*, because they are, like a lamp, (mere) instruments (in aid) of knowledge. The *manas* (faculty of attention) is not the *ātman*, because it is unsteady and does not exist during dreamless sleep.

53—61. Since (dreamless sleep) culminates in happiness, (this) happiness alone constitutes the body (*i.e.*, the essential nature) of the self (*ātman*). The *prāṇa* supports (that sheath of) the self which is made up of food; the *manas* supports (that sheath of) the self which consists of) the *prāṇa*; and the well known Supreme Self, Govinda, who is Existence-Knowledge-Bliss, supports the (sheath made up of the) *manas*.

When the *ātman*, by means of the external senses, experiences (all) such objects as are turned away from itself, then there arises the waking state, which is denoted by the name of *viśva*. When,

in fact solely by means of the *manas*, (it) experiences dreams, whose contents are obtained through the external senses, then that state of the Supreme Self, which is called *taijasa*, has to be understood (to have arisen).

When the *ātman* abides in the *manas*, which is (itself) swallowed up by the darkness of ignorance, then it (the self) is known to be in the state of dreamless sleep, which is called *prājñā* and is indicated by (the characteristic of) *ānanda* (bliss).

Even in sleep the *prāṇa* (or life) abides, so as to remove the erroneous impression of death (in relation to a person who is merely sleeping).

Otherwise dogs would eat up the sleeping person, or (people) would cremate (him) religiously in the sacred fire. Even in (dreamless) sleep there is surely the endurance of bliss, because (a sleeping person) on waking up and remembering (his immediately past condition) speaks out on reflection thus—'I slept happily.'

(This) view may be (granted). This happiness (however) cannot be what is derived out of the objects of the senses, for the reason that there are (during deep sleep) no (such) objects (perceived). Because (also) it has to be made out (through reflection), it cannot be real (happiness in itself). Therefore there is (here) the illusion of happiness in respect of (what is merely) the absence of pain.

Even though the counter-correlative (thereof) is not (fully) perceived, the absence of all (things) is (capable of being) apprehended; because, when asked again, (the man who has risen from sound sleep), speaks to another of (his own apprehension of) the absence of all (things). It is in accordance with this reasoning that the absence of the apperception of feelings is experienced.

62. Here we give (this) reply to the objection, (namely), that the absence of pain is not (at all capable of being) perceived. Since it is said (that the happiness of deep sleep is experienced) by one who has risen from sleep, the sleeping person (himself) cannot constitute a witness in relation to (any) absence of apperception.

63. Since, in (deep) sleep, the counter-correlative of a negation is not apprehended, the character of such (an unapprehended)

counter-correlative belongs to pain. In the opinion of the *Prābhākaras*, the negative proof of non-perception (by which the non-existence of things is proved) is not admissible.

64-65. According to the view of the *Naiyāyikas*, the negative proof of non-perception (relating to the negation of existence) does not differ from direct perception. This foolish philosophic disputant, who declares that, in the state of final beatitude, the *ātman* exists (much) like a stone owing to the cessation of pleasure, pain, etc.,—what will he not say ?

Thus it is established that the self (*ātman*) has the character of being the witness of nescience and of being eternal bliss (also).

66-67. (Our) opponents say in this connection that there is (in the universe) a plurality of souls. (They say)—“If (the *ātman*) is (only) one in all beings, then, on any one man dying, all will have to die ; on (any one) being born, (all) will have to be born ; and on (any one) doing an act, (all) will have to do (that same act). In these respects in all beings contradictory characteristics are (to be) seen.

68-69. Therefore in relation to the (numerous) bodies of all (beings), the plurality of souls is (well) established.

(To this the reply is)—“Plurality in relation to (the souls of) men has been declared by you (our opponent) only in view of their contradictory characteristics. Now tell (us) where (these) contradictory characteristics are seen (to exist)—in the body or in the self (*ātman*)? If in the body, then what is proved is the plurality of bodies. Consequently what (has that to do) with the self?”

70-71. If the differentiation (into many) be in relation to the self (itself), which is of the nature of (pure) consciousness, then (it) may (well) occur in relation to one and the same man. In the manner, in which one and the same moon becomes characterised by many-ness in relation the (several) vessels of water (wherein it may happen to be reflected)—(in that same manner) the manifestation of the one *Ātman* (as many) in relation to several bodies has (also) been understood (to occur).

The self (or *ātman*) is distinct from the five sheaths (of the soul), from the six modifications in condition (appertaining to all produced things), and from the six waves of infirmity.

72. (It) is distinct from the body, the senses, the *manas*, the intellect, the life-breath and egoity ; (it) is one in all bodies and is immodifiable and untainted.

73. (It) is eternal and is no doer of actions ; (it) is self-luminous and all-pervading, and is free from (the experience of sensuous) enjoyments ; (it) is of the same nature as the *Brahman*, and is devoid of qualities ; (it) is pure, and in itself consists solely of intelligence as constituting its essential nature.

74. As characterised by limiting conditions, (it becomes) the doer and the enjoyer, and is polluted with desires, etc., and has its (very) nature tainted within the body by means of egoity and (other) such (things).

75-76. Accordingly, as characterised by limiting conditions and as enveloped in the eightfold bondage, (the *ātman*), moving in obedience to *karma*, wanders about (in bodies) beginning with (that of) *Brahmā* and ending with (that of) immoveable things ; and attains, through (the performance of prescribed ritualistic) works, the world of the *pitṛs* and other such worlds : through (the performance of) prohibited works, (it goes) to hell and other such (places) : through (the acquisition of philosophic) wisdom, (it attains) the state of being united unto the *Brahman* : and if devoid of that (wisdom, it) gets into a state of despicable lowness.

77. The Self is one only and Supreme, having the three world created (for Itself) by Itself. Bondage, freedom and other such distinguishing conditions (in relation to It) may (well) happen to be possible in the manner of dreams.

78. Or perhaps the souls are many (in number), and are characterised by the nescience which gives rise to (their) *saṁsāra*. Since (this) nescience is beginningless, there is surely no fallacy of reciprocal dependence (here in relation to this view).

79. Another view is that both these (ideas of oneness and plurality) are appropriate (in relation to souls), for the reason that they form a distributive aggregate. There is oneness from the stand-point of view of a collective whole, and (there is) plurality from the stand-point of view of a discrete collection.

80. (The Self) is, in the forms of consciousness and nescience, the witness of (all) things, which consist of non-intelligence and are characterised by mediate or immediate relationship (to It) : and (It) is (thus) always in (possession of) omniscience.

81. With the coat of nescience fastened on, It happens to be merely illusion in dreamless sleep and in other such states, and is (at the same time) capable of remembering even such things as were experienced in the course of other re-births (as an embodied being).

82. Through that which makes It have such (other re-births), It becomes subject here to (all) the details of differentiation ; and (on Its) transcending the five states (in which It may manifest Itself), It is made out to be the knower that (truly) knows the *Brahman*.

83. The definition of proof (*māna*) in general is nothing other than that it is a means of (arriving at) true knowledge ; and in accordance with the difference in the definiteness of that (knowledge), this (means of knowledge) is, as such, understood to be of two kinds.

84. Or the definition of proof may be that it is that which destroys ignorance : and this (proof) is accordingly known to be of two kinds, in consequence of its being differentiated into 'incomplete' and 'complete,' (according as the removal of the ignorance effected thereby is incomplete or complete).

85-86. That (proof of truth which is) derived out of sentences—such as 'That thou art'—is destructive of all ignorance.

Perception and that which is called inference, comparison (or analogy), and also scripture, circumstantial presumption, and the negative proof of non-perception—in fact these six alone form the means of proof. These are (all) names relating to such things as are comprised within phenomenal experience, and are not applicable (as means of proof) in relation to the *Ātman* (Self).

87. Although (the Self) has to be known by Itself and is incapable of being realised (otherwise), It is (nevertheless) made out to transcend speech and thought.

The theory of *Hiraṇyagarbha* does not very materially differ from the *Vēdānta*.

88. In that theory it is held that the *Puruṣa* is Bliss and that *prakṛti* is nescience. Knowledge is in fact of two kinds, according as it is inwardly directed or outwardly directed.

89. The internally directed (knowledge) is that which is turned towards Bliss; and the externally directed (knowledge) is that which is turned towards outside objects. The illusory modifications of the nescience appertaining to the *Ātman* constitute the fivefold rudimentary elemental principles.

90. From the five rudimentary elemental principles have been produced the five internal instruments (of the soul), namely the *manas* (or the faculty of attention), the intellect, egoity, the mind, and also (the idea of) knowership.

91. Egoity consists of the element of earth; and knowership is born out of the element of *ākāśa* (ether). It is these two instruments that (together) manifest themselves in the form of (the idea of) agentship (in relation to actions).

92. The intellect is born out of the element of fire, the (conscious) mind is born out of the element of water, and the *manas* is born out of the element of air.

It has to be made out (further) that each of the (five) elements of earth, etc., is characterised by five attributes.

93. (The principle of) egoity, the principal vital air, the nose and smell, together with the organ of evacuation, are (all evolved attributes) pertaining to the (element of) earth: the mind the *apāna* (variety of vital air), and the tongue and taste and the organ of reproduction are the (evolved) attributes pertaining to (the element of) water.

94. The intellect, the *udāna* (variety of vital air), and the eye and colour (or form) and the feet are (the evolved attributes) pertaining to (the element of) fire: the *manas*, the *vyāna* (vital air), the skin and the sense of touch and the hand are similarly the (evolved) attributes pertaining to (the element of) air.

95. Knowership, the *samāna* (vital air), the ear and sound and speech are all (attributes) evolved out of (the element of) *ākāśa* (ether).

Out of the (five) subtle elements are evolved (certain) other attributive things—five from each.

96. Bone, skin, flesh, blood-vessels and hair are the attributive things (evolved out) of the (subtle element of) earth : similarly urine, phlegm, blood, semen and the marrow of bones are the attributive things (evolved out) of (the subtle element of) water.

97. Sleep, thirst, hunger, sexual appetite and laziness are born out of the (subtle) element of fire : walking, jumping, climbing, rising up and obstructing are (evolved out of the subtle element) of air.

98. Desire and anger, covetousness and fear and infatuation are similarly the attributive things (evolved out) of (the subtle element of) *ākāśa* (ether).

That path (of religious discipline), which is to be followed by those, who have renounced all worldly attachments, has been taught by Kṛṣṇa himself to Uddhava.

99-99½. It is indeed seen (given) in the *Purāna* having the name of *Śrī-Bhāgavata*.

He, who hears (that is, learns,) in the proper order these well abridged conclusions of all the (various) systems (of philosophy and religion) culminating in (the system of) the *Vēdānta*—(he) becomes the knower (of the truth) of things and (also becomes) in reality a learned person in this world.

Thus ends the twelfth chapter known as the system of the *Vēdānta* in the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṅgraha* composed by the venerable Śaṅkarācārya.